The impact of social security on the stock of physical capital: new approaches by Sánchez Romero, Miguel
UNIVERSIDAD AUTO´NOMA DE MADRID
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONO´MICAS Y EMPRESARIALES
DEPARTAMENTO DE ANA´LISIS ECONO´MICO: TEORI´A ECONO´MICA E
HISTORIA ECONO´MICA
DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
The Impact of Social Security on the Stock




DIRECTOR: FELIPE SAEZ FERNA´NDEZ
A mi familia y, en especial, a mi abuelo
Antonio Romero Capilla
Contents
List of Figures iii




1.1 Organization of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Welfare Gain and the Demand for Annuities 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Overview of Life Annuities Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 Consumption Trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2 Welfare Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Demand for Private Annuities and Social Security: Consequences
to Individual Wealth 68
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
i
3.2 Optimal Portfolio Choice under Uncertain Lifetime: Bonds, Equities,
and Annuities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Payroll Tax and Wealth-Age Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4 Effects of a Fully Funded Social Security on the Demand for Private
Annuities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4.1 Perfect Life Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.2 Imperfect Life Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Appendix 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.7.1 The Merton’s Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.7.2 Analysis of solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.8 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4 Demography and Uncertainty in Economic Growth: An Applica-
tion to Social Security 120
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.2 Demographic Accounting Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.3 Aggregate and Per Capita Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.4 Economic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.5 Impact of Social Security in Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.5.1 Funded Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.5.2 Unfunded Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.8 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146




2.1 Selected consumption trajectories, r = .02, δ = 0, γ = 2, w = 16.000,
k(65) = 100.000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Survival Curves for Different Spanish Cohorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656} . . . . . 44
2.4 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656} . . . . . . 44
2.5 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656} . . . . . . 44
2.6 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 33.379} . . . . . 45
2.7 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 31.041} . . . . . . 45
2.8 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 28.234} . . . . . . 45
2.9 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709} . . . . . 47
2.10 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709} . . . . . . 47
2.11 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709} . . . . . . 47
2.12 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 20.909} . . . . . 48
2.13 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 19.444} . . . . . . 48
2.14 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 17.686} . . . . . . 48
2.15 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510} . . . . . 50
2.16 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510} . . . . . . 50
2.17 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510} . . . . . . 50
2.18 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 16.865} . . . . . 51
2.19 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 15.683} . . . . . . 51
2.20 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 14.265} . . . . . . 51
2.21 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326} . . . . . 53
iii
2.22 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326} . . . . . . 53
2.23 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326} . . . . . . 53
2.24 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 13.798} . . . . . 54
2.25 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 12.831} . . . . . . 54
2.26 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 11.671} . . . . . . 54
2.27 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980} . . . . . 57
2.28 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980} . . . . . . 57
2.29 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980} . . . . . . 57
2.30 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 22.134} . . . . . 58
2.31 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 20.583} . . . . . . 58
2.32 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 18.722} . . . . . . 58
2.33 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031} . . . . . 60
2.34 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031} . . . . . . 60
2.35 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031} . . . . . . 60
2.36 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 15.441} . . . . . 61
2.37 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 14.359} . . . . . . 61
2.38 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 13.061} . . . . . . 61
2.39 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463} . . . . . 63
2.40 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463} . . . . . . 63
2.41 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463} . . . . . . 63
2.42 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 12.004} . . . . . 64
2.43 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 11.163} . . . . . . 64
2.44 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 10.153} . . . . . . 64
2.45 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418} . . . . . 66
2.46 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418} . . . . . . 66
2.47 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418} . . . . . . 66
2.48 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 10.034} . . . . . 67
2.49 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 9.331} . . . . . . 67
2.50 Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 8.487} . . . . . . 67
iv
3.1 Gross Earning Profile (w(s)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 Wealth Profiles: Payroll Taxes 3 and 6 Percents . . . . . 81
3.3 Wealth Profile: Payroll Tax 8 Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4 A.E.W. by Age Without Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.5 A.E.W. by Age With Social Security and Fair Annuities . 87
3.6 Consumption, Individual Wealth and A.E.W. by Age, With
Social Security and Unfair Private Annuities (̟=0,50; γ = 2) 91
3.7 Gross Salary Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.8 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
65, γ = .75, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.9 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
65, γ = .75, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.10 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
70, γ = .75, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.11 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
70, γ = .75, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.12 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
65, γ = .75, and w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.13 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
65, γ = .75, and w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.14 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
70, γ = .75, and w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.15 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
70, γ = .75, and w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.16 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
65, γ = 2, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.17 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
65, γ = 2, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.18 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
70, γ = 2, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
v
3.19 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
70, γ = 2, and w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.20 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
65, γ = 2, and w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.21 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
65, γ = 2, and w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.22 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J =
70, γ = 2, and w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.23 Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J =
70, γ = 2, and w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.1 Stable Population Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.2 The Dynamic of Consumption per Capita for an Annuitized
Economy with Perfect Foresight Agents. Case: n, δ > 0
and γ > 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.3 The Phase Diagram for an Annuitized Economy with Per-
fect Foresight Agents. Case: n, δ > 0 and γ > 1. . . . . . . . 134
4.4 Economic Transitions between Equilibria Points: Funded
Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.5 Economic Transitions between Equilibria Points: Unfunded
Social Security (τ = 0.08) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.6 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1940, J = 65. . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.7 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1940, J = 70. . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.8 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1960, J = 65. . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.9 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1960, J = 70. . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
vi
4.10 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1980, J = 65. . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.11 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1980, J = 70. . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.12 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 2000, J = 65. . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.13 Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 2000, J = 70. . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Determination of the Value c(x,x)
cˆ(x,x) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW) Values . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Maximum Loads (̟) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Survival Curves: Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Mortality Hazard Rates (Men): µ(x) = αeβx . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Survival Curves: Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Mortality Hazard Rates (Women): µ(x) = αeβx . . . . . . . . 36
2.8 Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Men): 1940 and 1960 . . . 38
2.9 Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Men): 1980 and 2000 . . . 39
2.10 Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Women): 1940 and 1960 . 40
2.11 Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Women): 1980 and 2000 . 41
2.12 Pension Benefits (Men): Unfunded Social Security . . . . . 42
2.13 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.14 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.15 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.16 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.17 Unfunded Pension Benefits (Women) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
viii
2.18 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.19 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.20 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.21 Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.1 Benefits (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2 Individual Wealth at the age of 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3 Private Wealth at the age of 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Private Wealth under Unfair Annuities at the age of 65 . 89
3.5 Individual Wealth at the age of 65 under Unfair Annuities
(γ = 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6 Stationary Wage Profiles According to both the Age of
Retirement and the Cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.7 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = .75, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.8 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = .75, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.9 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = .75, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.10 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = .75, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.11 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = .75, and
w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.12 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = .75, and
w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
ix
3.13 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = .75, and
w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.14 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = .75, and
w = 18.474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.15 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.16 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.17 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.18 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2, and
w = 19.180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.19 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2, and
w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.20 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2, and
w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.21 Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2, and
w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.22 Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2, and
w = 17.179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.2 Steady Consumptions and Physical Capitals per Capita:
Golden Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
x
Agradecimientos
Esta tesis no hubiera sido posible sin la valiosa ayuda, apoyo y est´ımulo que durante los
u´ltimos an˜os he recibido de muchas personas:
Por orden cronolo´gico, al Profesor Barea, Jose´ Antonio Herce y Juan Francisco Jimeno
por ser mi referente y modelo en el estudio de las pensiones.
Agradezco a Jose´ Manuel Rodriguez por darme la primera oportunidad de comenzar con
lo que era y es mi vocacio´n.
Maximino Ca´rpio y Paloma Tobes por confiar en mi profesionalidad para escribir el que
ha sido mi primer art´ıculo sobre pensiones. Del mismo modo, Jose´ Antonio Ortega por
apoyar y avalar mi potencial para cumplir uno de mis suen˜os.
Gracias a todo el Departamento de Demograf´ıa de la Universidad de Califo´rnia, en
Berkeley por su ca´lida acogida. En especial, Ronald Lee por aconsejar y guiarme en el
camino correcto acerca del estudio del problema de la Seguridad Social. Alan J. Auerbach
y Kenneth Wachter por sus comentarios y sus excelentes clases.
Al Departamento de Economı´a Cuantitativa de la UAM por su apoyo puntual a la hora
de resolver algunos aspectos matema´ticos. Muy en especial, debo agradecer en este sentido
a Ester Gonzalez, Ana Primo y Eugenia Rosado.
El congreso internacional World Risk and Insurance Economic Congress (WREIC), en
Utah, por los comentarios a un trabajo preliminar de la tesis. Principalmente a dos asis-
tentes, Jason Seligman por sus sugerencias y a Jeffrey Brown, por proporcionarme art´ıculos
y darme a´nimos cuando ma´s lo necesitaba, reconociendo la val´ıa del primer art´ıculo de la
tesis.
Gracias a la Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid por la financiacio´n recibida a trave´s de
la beca FPU, pues no so´lo me ha permitido sobrevivir durante los u´ltimos cuatro an˜os, sino
que tambie´n me ha aportado la estabilidad e independencia necesaria.
A mi Departamento, por aportarme el ambiente acade´mico de tranquilidad y trabajo
de los que he gozado durante el desarrollo de la tesis. Personalizo el agradecimiento en
Fernando Belenguer, Maite Blazquez, Eva Camacho, Ainhoa Herrarte, Carlos Llano, Julia´n
Moral, Richard Watt y Jose´ Luis Zof´ıo por su apoyo y a´nimo, as´ı como sugerencias y
comentarios, que han enriquecido cada uno de los cap´ıtulos de esta tesis.
Holly Fox y Richard Watt por sus consejos lingu¨´ısticos en ingle´s.
Mencio´n especial merece la pena resaltar a mi director Felipe Sa´ez. Su confianza,
est´ımulo y trabajo ha permitido terminar esta tesis, la cual nos parec´ıa a priori inalcan-
zable.
Mis amigos y, en especial, Ester por todo el tiempo que se merecen y no les he podido
dedicar.
Por u´ltimo, a mi hermano y a mis padres les debo reconocer el inmenso esfuerzo para
que dispusiera de las mejores condiciones, aunque para ello no haya estado f´ısicamente a su
lado en determinadas e´pocas. Mi abuelo, modelo de persona buena, inteligente, paciente y
tolerante, que con su amor, silencios y excelentes consejos ha sido y sera´ mi gu´ıa. Espero
que esta tesis pueda ser motivo del orgullo que siempre me mostro´.
xi
Resumen
Garantizar un sistema pu´blico de pensiones, caracterizado por una poblacio´n enve-
jecida, es uno de los ma´s importantes retos econo´micos que los pa´ıses desarrollados
deben hacer frente. En los u´ltimos cuarenta an˜os, las investigaciones acerca de las
consecuencias que produce la Seguridad Social han sido muy abundantes, pero dos
temas han centrado la mayor parte de las investigaciones: i) la pe´rdida de competi-
tividad que origina la Seguridad Social, como consecuencia del efecto expulsio´n sobre
el capital, y ii) la bu´squeda de pol´ıticas econo´micas que contrarresten el futuro de´ficit
del sistema de reparto provocado por el envejecimiento poblacional. En relacio´n con
esto u´ltimo, algunas de las principales pol´ıticas sugeridas son: i) transformar el
sistema de reparto a uno de capitalizacio´n, ii) desarrollar y promover la inversio´n
en planes de pensiones privados, iii) modificar el ca´lculo de la pensio´n inicial y iv)
retrasar la edad de jubilacio´n, entre otros. Sin embargo, la gran mayor´ıa de estas
propuestas esta´n basadas en modelos econo´micos de equilibrio parcial, en los cuales el
agente econo´mico no posee la capacidad de elegir entre planes de pensiones pu´blicos
y privados. Por consiguiente, el objetivo de esta tesis es: en primer lugar, analizar
la conveniencia para el agente econo´mico de un sistema pu´blico de pensiones. En
segundo lugar, desarrollar un nuevo marco teo´rico con el fin de analizar no so´lo los
efectos a largo plazo derivados de un seguro pu´blico, sino tambie´n las consecuen-
cias econo´micas que provoca la interaccio´n de un seguro pu´blico y otro privado en la
economı´a.
En el primer cap´ıtulo de la tesis, presentamos el modelo de eleccio´n o´ptima
de consumo bajo incertidumbre vital de Yaari (1965). El objetivo que perseguimos
en este cap´ıtulo es comprender porque´ el agente econo´mico no invierte la cantidad
suficiente de sus recursos, para garantizar su pensio´n a trave´s de seguros de vida y
planes de pensiones privados, tambie´n denominado en la literatura econo´mica como
“annuity puzzle”. Con este propo´sito, cuando no hay restricciones a la liquidez y los
mercados son completos, demostramos que un individuo egoista puede no obtener una
ganancia en su bienestar cuando asegura sus ahorros. As´ı, la decisio´n de contratar
un seguro depende de la relacio´n entre el valor presente de los ingresos futuros y el
nivel de renta inicial. Este resultado extiende la teor´ıa de la demanda de seguros y
proporciona un marco ido´neo para el estudio de los efectos econo´micos derivados de
la existencia conjunta de seguros pu´blicos y privados.
En el segundo cap´ıtulo introducimos una seguridad social de capitalizacio´n en el
modelo de Yaari (1965). Con este nuevo marco teo´rico, analizamos los niveles de
riqueza del agente econo´mico, invertidos de manera coactiva por la Seguridad Social
y de manera voluntaria en seguros de vida privados. Por medio de simulaciones
obtenemos que una seguridad social de capitalizacio´n puede contribuir a alcanzar
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mayores niveles de riqueza, incluso cuando el agente econo´mico es egoista. Sin
embargo, este resultado es muy sensible al tipo de cotizacio´n a la Seguridad Social
y a los recargos sobre primas que impongan las compan˜´ıas de seguros privados. Por
ejemplo, un tipo de cotizacio´n a la Seguridad Social del 6 por ciento y mercados de
seguros privados actuarialmente justos, incrementan la riqueza acumulada destinada
a la pensio´n en un 17 por ciento, pero si los seguros privados no son actuarialmente
justos, la riqueza acumulada puede decrecer en torno al 10 por ciento.
En el u´ltimo cap´ıtulo desarrollamos un modelo de crecimiento econo´mico con
generaciones solapadas, en el cual los individuos son heteroge´neos y desconocen, a
priori, la edad a la que morira´n. Con el doble objetivo de analizar el modelo de
crecimiento econo´mico con datos reales y no perder las propiedades que este modelo
nos proporciona, el marco contable utilizado es longitudinal, en vez de transver-
sal. Gracias a este cambio, demostramos que una economı´a cla´sica presenta estados
estacionarios mu´ltiples. La regla de oro y la regla de oro modificada son dos de los
posibles equilibrios. Posteriormente, introducimos la Seguridad Social en el modelo
para analizar que´ efectos econo´micos produce esta institucio´n en el largo plazo. As´ı,
tambie´n demostramos que, bajo una poblacio´n estable, tanto un sistema de reparto
como un sistema de capitalizacio´n pueden alcanzar un crecimiento econo´mico igual
al crecimiento poblacional. Este u´ltimo resultado implica que la seguridad social de
reparto no produce nungu´n efecto expulsio´n a largo plazo del capital. Adema´s, una
seguridad social de reparto proporciona una mayor estabilidad a la economı´a que un
sistema de capitalizacio´n.
Como s´ıntesis del valor an˜adido de la tesis cabe destacar tres aspectos princi-
pales. Primero, la aportacio´n realizada a la teor´ıa de la demanda de seguros, gra-
cias a la cual no so´lo justificamos la escasa demanda de seguros de vida y planes
de pensiones, sino tambie´n nos permite su incorporacio´n dentro de los modelos de
la teor´ıa del consumidor. En segundo lugar, demostramos que la Seguridad Social
puede mejorar, en el corto plazo, los niveles de riqueza de los agentes econo´micos,
incluso cuando e´stos son egoistas. Finalmente, extendemos la teor´ıa del crecimiento
econo´mico con generaciones solapadas, por medio de la transformacio´n del marco
contable transversal en longitudinal. Esta transformacio´n, por un lado, proporciona
una mejora en el ana´lisis de cualquier pol´ıtica econo´mica, pues elimina la dificultad
existente entre el uso de los modelos de crecimiento econo´mico con generaciones so-
lapadas y el ana´lisis emp´ırico de los efectos derivados del cambio poblacional y, por
otro lado, proporciona un marco teo´rico-econo´mico o´ptimo para el ana´lisis conjunto




One of the most important economic challenges for developed countries is to guar-
antee a retirement income system in a society characterized by an aging population.
In the future, this challenge will require not only an increasing flow of economic re-
sources, but also a long-term agreement among politicians, firms, and labor unions.
Exactly the same kind of long-term agreement took place more than a century ago,
but under quite different socio-economic circumstances.
The introduction of the social security system by Prussian Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck in 1889 helped members of the military to receive an income during their
retirement, while at the same time recognizing their work for the country. Over
the next 46 years more than twenty nations (mostly European) would develop some
sort of social insurance. However, the first country to offer social security coverage
to the entire society was the USA when the Social Security Act was passed in
1935. Both reforms were proposed under an economic situation of scarcity. Retirees,
disables, widows, and orphans did not have enough wealth accumulated to maintain
their economic status because industrialization had left aside those people who were
unable to work. Hence, the economic situation coupled with a young population
structure suggested that in the short run the most convenient social security was an
unfunded system.
After six decades problems have arisen within the current demographic situation
concerning the future feasibility of the unfunded social security system. For exam-
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ple, an aging population will excessively raise the fiscal pressure on future workers.
This is because in an unfunded social security current workers pay the pension ben-
efits of current retirees. Therefore, the unfunded system is based on a continuing
intergenerational redistribution of economic resources, in which younger cohorts are
worse off as the population ages.
We already know from the life-cycle theory of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954),
and Ando and Modigliani (1957) that a payroll tax depresses personal savings. In
addition to this, Feldstein (1974) pointed out that the pay-as-you-go system not
only has a negative impact on personal savings, but it also distorts the labor supply
by encouraging people to retire earlier, as well as by reducing its flexibility. As a
consequence, the crowding out effect produced in the stock of physical capital could
lead to an important reduction in the competitiveness of a country. Some of the
solutions given to this problem include i) switching the unfunded system to a funded
system, ii) developing annuity private markets, iii) finding formulae that reduce the
pension benefits, or even iv) delaying the age of retirement, among other alternatives.
In this thesis however, rather than enumerating other solutions, we directly analyze
the root of social insurance. First, we will question whether or not a social security
pension system is convenient, and in the case of being so, determine which social
security system is the best. Second, we will develop a theoretical framework to
analyze an economy with both public and private pension systems. This theoretical
framework will evolve from a partial economic model with a representative agent
into a growth economic model with heterogeneous people and realistic demography.
In general, the necessity of a social security has been politically justified by the
myopic behavior of individuals.1 This sort of behavior prevents people from saving
the necessary amount of wealth for certain life circumstances such as retirement or
unemployment. However, this justification is not generally accepted in economic
theory. The economic literature, by contrast, has usually argued that a social secu-
1That is, because people are not rational, they are unable to correctly value their present and
future resources. An experiment testing the assumptions of rational choice is Kotlikoff et al. (2001).
They found that subjects displayed significant inconsistencies in their consumption decisions.
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rity pension system is necessary due to the lack of a private annuity market. In fact,
if people face an uncertain length of life and an annuity market does not exist, they
will tend to anticipate future consumptions by depleting their wealth more quickly.
In addition to the lifetime uncertainty, if financial institutions do not allow individ-
uals to die in debt, then they will not save enough money for retirement. These
conclusions are obtained from the model presented in the seminal paper of Yaari
(1965). In this paper, he claimed that a selfish individual will fully annuitize her
savings, so long as the annuity yield exceeds the risk-free yield and that is impos-
sible for an individual to die in debt. Nevertheless, there is no empirical research
that demonstrates this claim.2 Hence, in the economic literature we find models
that either assume an economy in which individuals fully annuitize their savings, or
other models in which private annuities do not exist (thus, a social security system
is needed, Eckstein et al. (1985), and Merton (1983), among others). Present-day
developed countries usually have well developed private insurances as well as a so-
cial security pension system. However, people still do not voluntarily insure their
wealth even with fiscal advantages. Therefore, in order to tackle the problem of
the feasibility of the social security pension system, it is first necessary to develop
a model in which both private and public pension systems exist and, for the sake
of reality, in which individuals can voluntarily decide whether or not to purchase
annuities. As a consequence, the first step is to solve the annuity puzzle.
During the past four decades economic research has tried to find out why in-
dividuals do not purchase annuities. Some of the reasons given for the annuity
puzzle are: i) the desire to leave a bequest at the time of death, ii) the low return
of private annuities, iii) the existence of close substitutes such as family transfers
and social security benefits, and iv) imperfections in the annuity market such as
the irreversibility of annuitization, and constant payouts. The first reason has been
explored the most, however there does not exist a consensus with respect to the
altruistic behavior, since by assuming a selfish individual who leaves an accidental
2This mismatch between the theoretical and empirical results has been called the “annuity
puzzle”.
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or involuntary bequest,3 we are almost able to obtain the stock of physical capital
accumulated through generations, see Abel (1985) and Gokhale et al. (2001b). Sec-
ond, even though U.S. government yields have exceeded annuity yields during many
periods, there is other research, e.g. Friedman and Warshawsky (1990), that obtains
opposite results without the expected increment in the demand for annuities. Third,
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) showed that family transfers and social security benefits
could affect the demand for private annuities by more than 70 percent. And yet
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) found that social security insurance does not signifi-
cantly offset private life insurances. Consequently, to explain the limited demand for
annuities, researchers usually assume that there exist market imperfections. More
recently, Davidoff et al. (2005) have found that a large fraction of annuitized wealth
remains optimal even with incomplete markets. They conclude that the lack of the
demand for annuities is caused by behavioral biases. In this thesis, and more specif-
ically in Chapters 2 and 3, we will develop a model that explain the small demand
for private annuities following Davidoff et al. (2005)’s suggestion.
In Chapter 2, this model will help us to understand why individuals do not
purchase annuities. And in Chapter 3, we will use this knowledge to examine the
effects of social security on personal savings. Thus, we will be able to analyze,
among other possibilities, the crowding out effect of social security on individual’s
wealth. The importance of this model with both public and private systems is
twofold. First, alternative methods (besides the social security) for financing future
consumptions at retirement must be found. Ceteris paribus the current economic
situation, we already know that young cohorts will have to pay, due to the aging
population, a greater payroll tax than current workers do. The second significance
is that there currently is no model which is able to simultaneously analyze how the
private annuity market and Social Security will evolve. In this sense, any economic
policy that attemps to make the social security system feasible should take into
account both systems.
Nevertheless, we should realize that the partial economic model of Chapters 2
3Wealth not consumed by a selfish individual at her death.
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and 3 is not sufficient to analyze the effects of social security on economic growth.
Economic variables such as wages, interest rates, and fiscal policies are continually
modified. A dynamic perspective of the variables is also crucial in studying Social
Security. And even more important seems to be the demographic transitions. Thus,
in order to analyze this issue it is necessary to include an economic growth model.
The economic analysis of Social Security in a dynamic general equilibrium model
is an accurate approach to the issue. However, it only allows an incomplete under-
standing, since it depends on simulations of particular cases. The growth model is
for studying a more exact approach, for example, either the crowding out effect or
the long-run welfare gains derived by a funded system relative to an unfunded sys-
tem. Nevertheless, this latter model has an unresolved aggregation problem. People
have different ages, different compositions of wealth, and different propensities to
consume. Blanchard (1985) solved the aggregation problem by assuming that in-
dividuals face, throughout their life, a constant instantaneous probability of death.
However, this assumption is the same as considering a representative agent, instead
of heterogenous agents. Indeed, as Blanchard acknowledged, a constant instanta-
neous probability of death means that independently of the age of any individual,
everyone have the same life expectancy, as well as propensity to consume. Calvo
and Obstfeld (1988) considered a dynamic continuous model with realistic demogra-
phy assumptions. Although, this paper is not prepared for empirical studies of the
life-cycle using data bases.
In this thesis, the fourth chapter develops an overlapping generation (OLG)
growth model, with realistic demography assumptions, in which we can examine the
life cycle of any heterogeneous individual. A pioneer work in this field is Bommier
and Lee (2003). Following Gale (1973), they developed an accounting framework in
an OLG model that links cross sectional and longitudinal constraints. Converserly,
we extend the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model by introducing a longitudinal account-
ing framework, instead of the cross-sectional account most frequently used.
This new longitudinal accounting framework, besides being more accurate for
analyzing economic policies as it enables us to keep the track of each individual
5
within the economy, leads us to a dynamic of consumption per capita not taken
into account before. As a consequence, after comparing the funding system with the
unfunded system, certain advantages of the funded system are undermined.
1.1 Organization of the thesis
The introduction is followed by three chapters. Chapter 2 presents a continuous life
cycle model that will study the annuity puzzle. In order to gain insight into this
puzzle, we will analyze consumption trajectories and utility levels. For the sake of
simplicity we will focus on the lifetime period from 65 to 85 years old. The individual
allocation process will be characterized by a behavioral bias suggested by Davidoff
et al. (2005). Therefore, in addition to the dynamic optimization method, we will
also use an algorithm based on the annuity equivalent wealth (AEW)4 to determine
whether the consumer decides to purchase annuities.
Chapter 3 deals with the effects of Social Security on the demand for private
annuities. We will use and extend the model introduced in Chapter 2 in two different
ways. First, we will apply the model to the life cycle, instead of doing so after the age
of 65. Second, we will modify the utility function in order to introduce a portfolio
with risky assets. Under this new framework, we will measure the impact of a funded
social security on the accumulation of wealth by means of various simulations. Both
public and private wealth profiles will be shown. Subsequently, we will determine
those payroll taxes that could possibly increase individual wealth.
Chapter 4 presents an OLG growth model with realistic demography. This model
uses a longitudinal accounting framework to analyze the life cycle of heterogenous
group of people. Indeed, it is the theoretical framework not only to aggregate het-
erogenous groups with either perfect foresight or myopic behaviors, but also to intro-
duce incomplete market conditions, such as liquidity constraints and private pension
systems with a small demand for annuities. Nonetheless, in order to show the im-
4The proportion of annuitized wealth that is necessary to achieve the utility level when the
consumer has no access to the annuity market.
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portance of this new framework we will only examine the economy under “classic”
conditions (perfect foresighted agents and complete Arrow-Debreu markets) and no
social security. Later, we will study the effects of both social security systems on eco-
nomic growth. In this chapter, we have used the dynamic optimization methodology,
as in previous chapters, as well as the dynamic system theory.
Although the behavior of each individual within the economy is explained in each
chapter, additional simulations contrasting the main results are included with tables
and figures at the end of the chapter. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation
providing a summary of the thesis’ findings and gives some lines of future research.
Finally, we have only included the basic references cited through the dissertation.




Welfare Gain and the Demand
for Annuities
This chapter extends the annuity demand theory, giving new reasons
for the small annuities demand. Regarding this problem, Yaari (1965)
claims, under the condition that no one can die in debt, that a selfish
consumer will fully annuitized her savings, insofar as annuity asset yield
dominate conventional assets yield. However, we demonstrated mathe-
matically that, in a standard life-cycle model, when borrowings are un-
constrained and financial markets are complete, a selfish consumer may
prefer not to annuitize her savings. In addition, we analyze the desire to
purchase annuities according to the risk aversion coefficient and wealth
composition.
2.1 Introduction
Upon retirement, individuals have to decide whether or not to finance their future
consumption using annuities. Regarding this problem, conventional economic theory
states that a selfish consumer will fully annuitized her savings, insofar as the yield of
annuity assets dominates that of conventional assets. This result, obtained by Yaari
(1965), was proved under the following conditions: i) the consumer’s preferences are
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depicted by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, ii) the eco-
nomic agent is a selfish consumer, iii) the yield of annuity assets dominates that of
conventional assets, and iv) a negative asset position is forbidden when the consumer
does not invest in annuities. Under these assumptions, however, there is no empiri-
cal research which supports Yaari’s theorem. By contrast, many explanations have
been proposed to give insights about the mismatch between the theoretical results
and the small demand for annuities in the real world. For example, Bernheim (1991)
suggests that consumers have altruistic feelings. Warshawsky (1988), Friedman and
Warshawsky (1990) and Mitchell et al. (1999) report that the yield of private annu-
ities does not exceed the market interest rate because of transaction costs. Kotlikoff
and Spivak (1981) demonstrate that intra-family transfers may substitute annuities
by more than 70 percent. Yagi and Nishigaki (1993) claim that it is optimal to
allocate wealth not only in annuities, but also in conventional assets, when annuity
payouts are constant. Even Brown and Warshawsky (2001) have pointed out other
imperfections in the annuity market, such as the lack of protection against inflation,
the irreversibility of annuitization and institutional barriers. However, research in
the field is still fashionable, not only because the reduced demand for annuities con-
tinues to be puzzling for economists, but also because of the increasing concern in
developed countries about the feasibility of the social security system.
Recently, Davidoff et al. (2005) have found that full annuitization is optimal
under complete markets, under even less restrictive assumptions than those used by
Yaari (1965), and also a large fraction of annuitized wealth remains optimal even
with incomplete markets. Therefore, they conclude that the lack of the demand for
annuities is caused by behavioral biases.
This chapter, following Davidoff et al. (2005), contributes to annuity demand
theory demonstrating that a selfish consumer may prefer not to annuitize her savings,
whenever a stream of future earnings is expected. This sort of behavior can be
explained in two different ways. On the one hand, the result is obtained by weakening
Yaari’s fourth condition (see above) or, equivalently, by allowing the consumer to
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have a negative asset position upon death, but at longevity age.1 On the other
hand, an alternative explanation for the result is found by assuming an agent with
shortsightedness, as is suggested by Davidoff et al. (2005). That is to say, the
consumer is only worried about having positive wealth up to a certain date.2
Hence, we aim to give new insights on the small demand for annuities. To
our knowledge, no one has mathematically proved that a selfish consumer under
complete markets can be better off by not annuitizing her wealth. This unexpected
result is only derived so long as there is a stream of future earnings. Thus, previous
results under complete market settings are complementary to these, since researches3
have thus far assumed an initial wealth, instead of a stream of earnings, which has
to be allocated throughout the agent’s lifespan.
The importance of this approach to the annuity puzzle is twofold. Firstly, it
gives some theoretical clues concerning the macroeconomic consequences of private
pension plans held by baby boomers, specially defined contribution (DC) plans.
Secondly, it can give a better understanding of consumer behavior. The former
is necessary for policy makers and insurance companies in order to encourage the
demand for annuities; since the alternative asset depletes wealth faster, even to the
point of outliving resources. Therefore, given the concern about the future feasibility
of the Social Security in the developed countries, it is convenient to study different
alternatives4 which increase the demand for life annuity benefits by DC holders. This
could contribute to a deeper knowledge on consumption-savings models. However,
this point needs further research.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the most relevant literature
about the demand for annuities. Section 2.3 describes the model that we use to
determine optimal consumption and develops two subsections, which explain the
reasons why the consumer may not decide to purchase annuities. The first subsection
1The final condition widely imposed on these models is zero wealth at longevity age.
2It is convenient to consider this date, in general, as her remaining expected life time, which is
always less than the time necessary to reach longevity.
3This is not the case of Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969).
4Brown and Warshawsky (2001) suggest several alternatives concerning this point.
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compares consumption trajectories under different investment possibilities. The
second subsection is devoted to the anaylsis of the welfare gain from not purchasing
annuities when a stream of future earnings is introduced into the model. Some
tables containing the Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW) are presented. Section 2.4
concludes by pointing out the importance of the findings and suggesting directions
for future research. The Appendix is located in Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 shows
some simulations.
2.2 Overview of Life Annuities Demand
Annuity demand theory has experienced significant development since Yaari (1965)’s
seminal paper, in which he proved that under the life-cycle hypothesis with an
uncertain lifetime, the optimal behavior of a selfish individual is to hold all assets
in the form of annuities. This statement is of extraordinary importance because, if
confirmed, it supplies economists with an important tool that enables both a deeper
knowledge of the consumer’s behavior, and also it enables the implementation of
more efficient public policies; e.g. do people save because of a concern for other
people, or simply our of concern for themselves? Or, what is the best way to finance
retirees income? Unfortunately, there is no empirical testing that confirms Yaari’s
result completely. In contrast, there seem to be several circumstances in which it
becomes unattractive to purchase annuities.
The desire to leave a bequest at the time of death, according to the literature,
is one of the most cited reasons for not fully annuitizing. However, and although
Yaari (1965) already contemplates this alternative, there does not exist a consensus
regarding the importance of the bequest motive on the consumer’s behavior; and
thus, whether or not the bequest motive can be used to justify the small demand for
annuities. According to this literature, there are researchers, on the one hand, such
as Abel (1985) or Gokhale et al. (2001a) who prove that accidental, or involuntary,
bequests5 are sufficiently rich to explain household inherited-wealth, reported by
5Wealth not consumed by a selfish individual at her death.
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Kotlikoff and Summer (1981);6 or Hurd (1989) in which it is determined that most
bequests are accidental and desired bequests are small on average. Others like
Brown (1999) point out that decisions about whether or not to annuitize DC plans
are not affected by the bequest motive. But, on the other hand, Bernheim (1991)
suggests that the existence of a strong bequest motive explains why people maintain
a positive fraction of resources in bequeathable forms.
Another well known reason is the low return on private annuities. Of course
it can not be guaranteed that a selfish consumer would prefer to purchase annu-
ities when their yield does not exceed the market interest rate. Nevertheless, this
is usually due to the price of fair annuities being increased by transaction costs,
or loads,7 which diminish the annuity yield below the risk free interest rate. For
instance, Warshawsky (1988) shows for the United States that Government Bond
yields exceeded annuity yields during the period 1919-1967. In contrast, Friedman
and Warshawsky (1990) obtain the opposite result, using the same methodology,
from 1968 to 1983. Finally, a more recent analysis, see Mitchell et al. (1999), has
reported that the internal rates of return for SPIAs8 available in 1995 were between
1 and 2 percent below the market returns.
In addition to these justifications, earlier researches have pointed out other im-
perfections in the annuity markets, as additional motives which decrease annuities
demand. Brown and Warshawsky (2001)9 suggest, among other possibilities, the fol-
lowing imperfections: i) the lack of protection against inflation, ii) the irreversibility
of annuitization, and iii) institutional barriers and legal issues. Others have shown
that constant payouts, offered by the private annuity system, is another motive for
not fully annuitizing. This leads Yagi and Nishigaki (1993) to claim that it is opti-
mal to allocate wealth both to annuities and to conventional assets, when annuity
payouts are constant throughout the retirement period. Recently, Davidoff et al.
6They stated that roughly eighty percent of U.S. wealth was inherited.
7Annuity loads can be decomposed into the following three components: a) reserves, which are
affected by the adverse selection problem, b) administrative costs and c) commissions and profits.
8Single-Premium Immediate Annuities (SPIA).
9Read this paper for a comprehensive extent literature review concerning these imperfections.
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(2005) have proved, under less restrictive assumptions than those used by Yaari
(1965), that positive annuitization remains optimal even with incomplete markets.
As a consequence, they suggest either psychological or behavioral biases as possible
explanations for the limited annuity demand.
Finally, private annuities have almost perfect substitute assets, such as family
transfers and Social Security benefits, that obviously affect their demand. The
former may substitute annuities by more than 70 percent, even when markets are
complete. This is so, as was shown by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), because family
members possess a level of information of each other that reduces problems like
moral hazard, adverse selection and deception, which nevertheless do affect insurance
companies. According to economic theory, insurance companies should substitute
dollar for dollar for private annuities. Therefore, coupling this statement with the
fact that Social Security benefits, in the developed countries, are the major flow
of income for retirees, we can expect that private annuities should have a small
demand. However, even with the existence of the social security system, Auerbach
(1987) obtains the result that households do not significantly offset social security
insurance by reducing their purchase of private life insurance. Consequently, we
can conclude that, although several reasons have been suggested, the demand for
annuities is still a puzzle for economists.
2.3 The Model
The aim of this section is to analyze consumption trajectories and utility levels under
an uncertain lifetime. The analysis will help to understand both the psychological
biases, and the economic circumstances, under which individuals are not willing to
purchase annuities. Moreover, the chapter will show the main consequences derived
from this irrational behavior.
We can assume under uncertain lifetime and complete markets that consumption
can be financed, for the sake of simplicity, by two alternative assets; e.g. conventional
assets and annuities. On the one hand, conventional assets yield a safe interest rate r
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and have the important property that the investment is bequeathable. On the other
hand, annuities are an actuarial contract between the consumer and an insurance
company. This contract consists of paying, at the beginning of the period, a single
premium to the insurance company in exchange for a lottery under which if the
consumer survives at the end of the period, she will receive the safe interest rate r
plus a risk premium µ contingent on her mortality risk; but, if she does not survive
at the end of the period, she will not receive anything. Thus, while conventional
assets are a bequeathable investment, annuities are not.
The consumption allocation process differs according to how important is the
desire to leave bequests. However, we will follow the theoretical stream that assumes
the consumer to be a selfish individual. Taking this into account, Yaari (1965) claims
that the consumer will fully annuitize her savings. This theorem was proved under
the condition of having a positive asset position throughout the lifespan. But, if
the condition is relaxed, instead of financing consumption through annuities, the
consumer may achieve a higher utility level by borrowing money and increasing
present consumption. This result, although mathematically proved in the following
pages, needs a further explanation.
The assumptions used by Yaari (1965) are rather close to reality. Therefore, it
does not seem useful to weaken the borrowing constraint, unless we are suspicious
that the consumer makes decisions subject to some irrationality. Following Davidoff
et al. (2005), we propose that the economic agent behaves myopically and so, once
the consumer has retired, she is only worried about having positive wealth during
her remaining expected life, and not up to longevity. The main consequence derived
from this behavior is a smaller demand for annuities, as well implying that consumers
are more likely to outlive their resources.
We use the following additional necessary assumptions, in order to purchase ac-
tuarially fair life-annuities: i) the only source of uncertainty is the time of death.
Longevity T is known in advance and is unalterable. ii) The probability of death Ω10
is known and exogenous, and is also common to every consumer. iii) The mature
10See Definition 2.1 located in the appendix, page 28.
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asset yields a known and safe interest rate. Nevertheless, and although these three
conditions eliminate both the adverse selection problem (i.e. there are no unhealth-
ier consumers who are more willing to purchase annuities than other healthier ones,
at a given premium) and the ruin11 problem, because the probability of death is
known, there are two remaining loads which decrease the annuities internal rate of
return. Consequently, if we assume that annuity yields at least dominate maturity
yields, then we need to include that iv) there are no family agreements which per-
mit transfers (see Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981), and finally v) annuity markets are
complete and their administrative costs are negligible.
Unfortunately, we have to realize that all of these conditions are not realistic.
Nonetheless, they are necessary not only to analyze the myopic behavior, because
of the possibility that the agent is not concerned about her future wealth as of a
certain age; but also to calculate, on the one hand, the level of utility achieved by
the consumer when her wealth is fully annuitized and, on the other hand, the level
of utility achieved without purchasing annuities. The standard comparison between
these two utility levels is labeled “Annuity Equivalent Wealth”12 (AEW), and it will
help later on to determine which asset is preferred by the consumer.
We shall proceed by introducing the mathematical problem faced by our con-
sumer. The expected utility function U , which we assume to be similar for every
consumer at a given age, will first be explained and, subsequently, two budget con-
straints will be presented. Each constraint will differ according to the asset selected
to finance future consumption.
Firstly, the individual at age x, as a selfish consumer, is depicted by the following






β(s− x)u(c(s, x))ds for all x ∈ [0, T ), (2.1)
11The possibility that an insurance company will not have enough reserves, in order to satisfy
the contracts, because of unexpected circumstances.
12See Brown (2003), Brown and Warshawsky (2001), Mitchell et al. (1999), Friedman and War-
shawsky (1990), among others.
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where in terms of Fisher-Yaari-Bommier13 (FYB), we henceforth denote: Ω(s)Ω(x) as
the (Fisher) rational discount function, β(s− x) as the (Yaari) subjective discount
function, and Ω(s)Ω(x)β(s−x) as the (Bommier) overall discount function. They measure
the value at age x associated with a unit of consumption at age s. In particular, Ω(s)Ω(x)
is the probability that an individual of age x will be alive at age s, while β(s− x) is
the widely used time discount factor from age x to age s, or e−δ(s−x),∀δ ≥ 0. Hence,
both Ω(·) and β(·) are positive real functions valued less than or equal to one. On the
other hand, u(·) is assumed to be a CRRA utility function of a risk averse consumer
(u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ , γ > 0), like the one used by Yaari (1965). And, c(s, x) represents the
rate of expenditure14 on consumption at age s, of an x year-old consumer.
This utility function has the important feature that, a single monetary unit of
consumption delivers a greater utility as the consumer ages. This is due to property
six of the rational discount function (see Definition 2.1, pag. 28). However, nowa-
days there exists a controversy about what type of rational discount function should
be used. According to this, there are three main theoretical streams. The first
supports the use of the common life tables, Hurd (1989), and Hurd and McGarry
(1995). Another supports the necessity of continuously correcting the survival prob-
ability due to time misperceptions, specially close to young and old ages, Hamermesh
(1985), Hurd and McGarry (2002) or Gan et al. (2003). And others like Bommier
(2001, 2003a,b) state that more accurate results can be obtained using hyperbolic
discounting, because individuals make inconsistent decisions. This chapter, however,
will not enter into the discussion and so, we will plug the common life tables, as
proxy values, into the rational discount function.
Secondly, the constraint faced by the consumer depends on whether she purchases






(w(s)− c(s, x))ds = 0, (2.2)
13See Bommier (2001), Fisher (1977).










(w(s)− c(s, x))ds = 0. (2.3)
(2.2) and (2.3) are respectively the budget constrained when consumption is
financed by investing in conventional assets, and when consumption is financed by
annuities. k(x) is initial wealth at age x, and w(s) is income at age s. There is
no restriction about the source of income; so, w(·) may be either Social Security
benefits when the agent is retired, or a salary if she continues working, or the sum of
many different periodical earnings. On the other hand, R(s)
R(x) is the financial present




















so that r(j) is the safe interest rate at age j yielded by the conventional asset, and
r(j) + µ(j) is the actuarially fair interest perceived in the case of being alive at the
end of period j. Neither (2.2) and (2.3) constrain wealth to be nonnegative along
the lifespan. Therefore, the consumer may be in debt at any time, although both
(2.2) and (2.3) implicitly assume that wealth at longevity should be zero.15
2.3.1 Consumption Trajectories
In this model, our individual must decide whether to invest in annuities or not.
Her decisions are subject to an irrational behavior known as myopia which, in this
case, means that she is not worried about having a negative asset position from a
certain date.16 Moreover, for the sake of reality we assume that financial markets
do not allow individuals to die in debt, and so we can expect that individuals will
15This is a necessary condition which represents the consumer’s selfish behavior into the budget
constraint.
16This statement is equivalent to the claim that the consumer assumes complete markets in which
loans are allowed.
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consume their income in each period. That is, we will follow Yaari (1965)’s problem
only when the consumer reaches an asset position of zero. We suggest this behavior
as a possible explanation for the small demand for annuities because it is usual
to see how retirees, with Social Security benefits, prefer not to annuitize their DC
plans, in order to enjoy their wealth at the beginning of their retirement, due to
the higher probability of becoming unhealthy over the remaining expected lifetime.
Nonetheless, the decision to purchase annuities depends on many more aspects which
will be explained later on.
Firstly, according to this model the individual’s welfare is based on her consump-
tion trajectories. Therefore, we need to know not only how consumption increases
over time, but also what the initial consumption is. This fact was studied previ-
ously by Barro and Friedman (1977), Davies (1981), Levhari and Mirman (1977),
among others, who compare consumption trajectories when the consumer purchases
annuities, with those trajectories when she does not. Optimal consumption growth,
both in the case of investing in conventional assets, and in the case of purchasing

















,∀s ∈ [x, T ). (2.5)
Hereinafter, in order to distinguish the two alternative investments, we denote by cˆ
the consumption trajectory when annuities are purchased.
Thus, (2.4) represents the way in which consumption increases over time when
an x year old consumer invests in conventional assets, while (2.5) does so when an
x year old consumer invests in annuities. Note from (2.4) and (2.5) that consump-
tion with an annuitized wealth grows faster. Concretely, over the lifespan, (2.4)
decreases markedly when the consumer approaches longevity, while (2.5) leads to
a continuously increasing consumption up to longevity, so long as r(s) > δ for all
s ∈ [x, T ).
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Secondly, if our aim is to understand why an individual at age x decides to
allocate her wealth to conventional assets, instead of annuities, it is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition that at least her c(x, x) should be greater than her cˆ(x, x).
According to this, we present in Table 2.1 the main factors that determine which
initial consumption is greater:
Table 2.1: Determination of the Value
c(x,x)
cˆ(x,x)
γ w(s) > 0 † w(s) = 0 ‡
(0, 1) > 1 > 1
{1} > 1 = 1
(1,→) unknown result < 1
† For at least one s ∈ [x, T ).
‡ For all s ∈ [x, T ).
To understand the meaning of Table 2.1 it is convenient to realize that the in-
troduction of annuities in an uncertain lifetime model produces both a substitution
effect and an income effect on initial consumption. This is so, because annuities
offer a greater yield than conventional assets. In relation to this fact, Levhari and
Mirman (1977) shows that when w(s) = 0 for all s ∈ [x, T ), life-span uncertainty
affects optimal consumption in two opposing ways. On the one hand, the individual
substitutes more future consumption for present consumption than under certainty.
On the other hand, uncertain lifetime decreases (resp. increases) consumption be-
cause of having the possibility of a longer (resp. shorter) life. Moreover, the risk
aversion coefficient γ together with a stream of future earnings plays a fundamental
role in the determination of the value c(x,x)
cˆ(x,x) ,∀x ∈ [0, T ) (see Table 2.1). In partic-
ular, the risk aversion coefficient γ is necessary to calculate the present value of a
future consumption. For example, whenever γ equals 1, a marginal unit of future
consumption financed either by conventional assets, or by annuities, has the same
marginal present value. Consequently, both initial consumptions will be alike. This
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fact shows up in column 3 (no future earnings) of Table 2.1. By contrast, assum-
ing that γ ∈ (0, 1) (resp. (1,→)), the future consumption financed by conventional
assets is less (resp. more) preferred than the future consumption financed by an-
nuities. Hence, because of the substitution effect c(x, x) should be greater (resp.
lower) than cˆ(x, x). In the second term, the stream of future earnings also modifies
the optimal initial consumption. Thus, the present value of a stream of future earn-
ings under actuarially fair insurance is lower than under conventional assets. Then,
future earnings have a negative effect on cˆ(x, x) in comparison with c(x, x).
In short, when γ and the stream of future earnings are taken into account simul-
taneously, we can note (see columns 2 and 3) that c(x, x) is greater than cˆ(x, x) for
a wider range of γ values. Concretely, the greater are future earnings with respect
to initial capital k(x), the wider is the range of γ values for which c(x, x) is greater
than cˆ(x, x). So, assuming that γ belongs to the open range (1,→),17 there exists
a slight difference between considering an initial wealth, or a stream of future earn-
ings. Nevertheless, this fact does not mean that the demand for annuities depends
on the risk aversion coefficient. By contrast, we should take into account the fact
that, when comparing c(x, x) with cˆ(x, x), there are two opposing effects. The less
risk averse the consumer is, cˆ(x, x) becomes lower with respect to c(x, x) but, si-
multaneously, (2.5) becomes greater than (2.4), and vice versa. Therefore, the risk
aversion coefficient leads to opposing results.
We find, however, that the difference between this result and those obtained
previously, lies in the introduction of a stream of future earnings under complete
markets. Therefore, it becomes interesting to analyze what the present value of
future earnings is, with respect to initial wealth. For instance, in the appendix it is
proved that, it is less (resp. more) likely that a retiree will decide to annuitize her
DC plan when she has a much greater (resp. lower) accumulated capital in Social Se-
curity benefits. The implications of this statement are: i) individuals with resources
in the form of capital (resp. non capital income) are more (resp. less) willing to
17Previous studies suggest that γ is typically above unity. For instance, Davies (1981) suggests
with a similar model a value of 4 as the best guess.
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purchase annuities; ii) Social Security benefits do not offset annuitized private pen-
sion plans completely, as Auerbach (1987) claims. In fact, there exists a threshold
that is positively related with the present value of future earnings, above which the
consumer will decide to annuitize her initial wealth. iii) individuals who choose not
to purchase annuities outlive their initial wealth faster. Hence, their c(x, x) will be
greater than those individuals who have annuitized their wealth (or cˆ(x, x)), because
they anticipate consumption. But they will consume exactly their income in each
period from the date that they have depleted their wealth. A representation of such
consumption trajectories is provided in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Selected consumption trajectories, r = .02, δ = 0, γ = 2, w = 16.000,
k(65) = 100.000





















































These two cases represent the consumption trajectories when the only source
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of income is initial wealth (Figure 2.1.a) and, when besides the initial wealth, a
periodic salary is introduced (Figure 2.1.b). The consumption trajectories are the
cases shown in columns 2 and 3, row 3 of Table 2.1. Specifically, blue circles (◦) plot
the consumption path of a consumer who is able to borrow money and who does not
purchase annuities. Red diamonds (♦) plot the consumption of an individual who
purchases actuarially fair annuities. And, black boxes (¤) plot the consumption
trajectory when the myopic consumer does not purchase annuities and financial
markets do not allow individuals to die in debt.
Note from Figure 2.1 that consumption under annuitized wealth, cˆ(s, x) is not
only always greater than c(s, x) for all s ∈ [x, T ), but also it increases from year
to year; while non-annuitized consumption decreases in Figure 2.1 from age 75.
On the other hand, contrary to case (a), we are able to see from case (b) that
non-annuitized initial consumption is greater than annuitized initial consumption.
Therefore, see Figure 2.1.b, non-annuitized consumption is greater than optimal
annuitized consumption up to age 76.
In conclusion, whenever γ belongs to the interval (0, 1), the early consumption
financed by conventional assets is greater than the early consumption financed by
annuities. Furthermore, c(x, x) can exceed cˆ(x, x) for γ-values that are greater than,
although close to, 1 and the greater is the stream of future earnings. These facts,
nevertheless, do not necessarily imply that specific values of γ lead to conventional
assets being more preferred than annuities.
2.3.2 Welfare Gains
It is pointed out by Yaari (1965) and proved by Hakansson (1969) that a selfish
consumer will fully annuitized her savings, so long as she cannot die in debt. Sub-
sequently, Kotlikoff and Summer (1981), Hurd (1989), Mitchell et al. (1999) and
Brown and Warshawsky (2001) show that a selfish consumer will fully annuitize her
initial wealth, even with complete markets. Recently, Davidoff et al. (2005) has
extended the annuity demand theory by presenting less restrictive conditions under
complete markets, under which we still get full annuitization. However, it has not
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been proved mathematically that a selfish consumer may prefer not to annuitize her
savings under complete markets, when both an initial wealth, and a stream of future
earnings are taken into account simultaneously.
We shall proceed by explaining the circumstances under which individuals are
not willing to purchase annuities. The explanation follows two steps. Firstly, we
show, with the help of Table 2.2 below, that the risk aversion coefficient does not
explain the demand for annuities, at least for the most common range of γ-values
used by economists. Secondly, we state Proposition 2.1, which is the main finding of
the chapter, and we shall outline its consequences upon the consumption allocation
process.
We assume that a consumer decides to purchase annuities, so long as this asset
leads to a welfare gain with respect to the alternative investment. In general, a
common and easy way to prove that a welfare gain exists is by means of the annuity
equivalent wealth (AEW), which is the proportion of annuitized wealth, that is
necessary to achieve the maximum utility level when the consumer has no access
to the annuity market. In other words, AEW offers an intuition about whether or
not the indifference curve under annuitized wealth is greater. Concretely, if this
proportion is greater (resp. less) than one, annuities (resp. conventional assets)
cause a welfare gain to the consumer. Table 2.2 reports the AEW values associated
with the problem depicted in Figure 2.1, when γ equals 2. Nevertheless, we have
introduced two additional cases in order to analyze the role of the risk aversion
coefficient.
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Table 2.2: Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW) Values
w(s) > 0† w(s) = 0‡
Age γ = .75 γ = 2 γ = 5 γ = .75 γ = 2 γ = 5
65 0.8982 0.9653 1.0389 1.4302 1.5342 1.6472
70 0.8011 0.9151 1.0440 1.4963 1.6412 1.7912
75 0.6993 0.8165 1.0492 1.5743 1.7740 1.9751
80 0.6472 0.7535 1.0547 1.6644 1.9369 2.2070
85 0.5940 0.7181 1.0612 1.7643 2.1317 2.4925
90 0.5450 0.6871 1.0719 1.8692 2.3540 2.8257
95 0.5107 0.6712 1.0943 1.9708 2.5860 3.1626
† For at least one s ∈ [x, T ), and ‡ for all s ∈ [x, T ).
Note: In this table, the mortality hazard rate is assumed to follow the Gompertz’s
Law (µ(x) = αeλx), where α is equal to exp(−11.74311) and λ = 0.106402, for
all x between 65 and 110 years old. Further, it has been used the same values
from Figure 2.1, in order to illustrate which consumption yields a greater utility
in each case.
The values shown in each column correspond to the AEW of our myopic con-
sumer, who starts at the age of 65 with an initial wealth of 100.000 euros and, for the
case of receiving a periodical endowment, we assume an annual salary of 16.000 eu-
ros. Moreover, the values reported in Table 2.2 take into account the wealth already
consumed. That is, the consumer’s wealth decreases from year to year. This is the
reason why the individual reinforces her decision to either finance the consumption
through annuities, or to finance her consumption through conventional assets. So,
once the consumer has invested in a specific asset, we may expect that she will hold
the investment.
Now, if we pay attention to columns 3 and 6 of Table 2.2, we can see the AEW
associated with Figure 2.1 (specifically, consumption trajectories plotted with black
boxes). Table 2.2 (column 6) confirms that the consumer achieves a higher utility
level by annuitizing her wealth, see Figure 2.1.a; while, in the case of Figure 2.1.b,
the consumer prefers to increase her early consumption by investing in conventional
assets, see Table 2.2 (column 3). However, the latter consumption trajectory depletes
wealth faster and, as a consequence, the individual only can consume her income as
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of age 77.
It has been pointed out that the decision as to whether to annuitize or not does
not depend on the risk aversion coefficient, Levhari and Mirman (1977). This result
also shows up in Table 2.2. Note that the AEW values do not change drastically when
the consumer’s risk aversion, at the age of 65, varies from 0.75 to 2. In fact, given the
resources assumed for the consumer, conventional assets yield greater welfare than
annuities for γ values up to 3 (whenever there is a stream of future endowments).
Thereinafter, the consumer will prefer to annuitize her wealth; e.g. γ = 5 as is
shown in Table 2.2. Hence, the risk aversion coefficient does not explain the demand
for annuities, because there exists a γ value, for which the consumer changes the
investment in conventional assets to annuities, that i) depends on Proposition 2.1
and ii) its value is, in general, outside the common range of γ values obtained by
economists.18
Proposition 2.1 When the individual is selfish and faces an uncertain lifespan, the
decision of whether or not to purchase an asset contingent upon her death depends on
the relationship between the present value of future earnings and the initial wealth.
Proposition 2.1 is principally of interest for understanding the small demand for
annuities. Being specific, annuities are less (resp. more) preferred than conventional
assets, the greater (resp. lower) is the present value of future earnings with respect
to the initial wealth. Note that we are considering a selfish individual. So, it is not a
necessary condition that the consumer has altruistic feelings, or a bequests motive, in
order not to purchase annuities. Furthermore, Proposition 2.1 assumes that not only
does the yield of annuities dominate that of conventional assets, but also annuities
are actuarially fair. Therefore, we can extract from Table 2.2 the following behavior:
i) our myopic consumer may not purchase actuarially fair annuities, when there
is a stream of future earnings; but ii) when the consumer is willing to purchase
assets contingent on her death, the insurance company can supply unfair annuities.
Table 2.3 below reports the maximum loading that the insurer can charge to the
18The mathematical proof is found in the Appendix, page 28.
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consumer. Finally, iii) when initial wealth is the only source of income, we find that
the consumer purchases annuities, even with unfair premiums (although the yield of
annuities must dominate that of conventional assets).
Table 2.3: Maximum Loads† (̟)
̟
k(65) γ = .75 γ = 2 γ = 5
100.000 ∗ ∗ .4000
150.000 ∗ .0950 .6850
200.000 ∗ .3150 .8500
250.000 .0550 .4825 .9600
∗ Conventional assets yield a greater welfare.
Note: w(s) = 16.000 for all s ∈ [x, T ). The for-
mula used to calculate the maximum load is as
follows: r(s) + (1−̟) · µ(s).
Table 2.3 illustrates how a consumer demands a greater yield, the lower is the
initial wealth with respect to the present value of future earnings (look at each
column from the bottom to the top). Another important finding shows up when the
consumer does not have earnings during future periods. In this particular case, our
individual usually decides to annuitize.
In short, whenever DC-plan holders behave as our myopic consumer, we can state
that Social Security benefits, or existing annuities, produce a crowding out effect on
brand new annuities. However, this crowding out is not always dollar for dollar. In
particular, the decision to annuitize new wealth depends on both future income, and
on psychological aspects (e.g. risk aversion and subjective time discount). Hence,
DC-plan holders with high Social Security benefits, or existing annuity payouts, will
not annuitize their plans, unless the capital compounded in their DC pension plans
is thought to be high enough. So, they choose a financial payout, which allows the
possibility of leaving bequests.
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2.4 Conclusions
This chapter contributes to the theory of the demand for annuities, providing new
insights on the annuity puzzle. We show that annuities may not cause a welfare
gain relative to conventional assets. Consequently, the consumer is not willing to
purchase annuities and so, she is more exposed to the risk of outliving her resources
at the end of her life. This situation can be explained in two different ways. On the
one hand, by relaxing the borrowing constraint condition imposed in Yaari (1965).
On the other hand, by following Davidoff et al. (2005), and assuming that the
economic agent is only concerned with having positive wealth during her remaining
expected life, instead of doing so up to longevity. So, once one of these approaches
is taken into account, we have found, firstly, that the risk aversion coefficient does
not explain the demand for annuities and, secondly, that the decision as to whether
or not to purchase an asset that is contingent upon her death, when the individual
is selfish and faces an uncertain lifespan, depends on the relationship between the
present value of future earnings and initial wealth.
The theoretical finding has important implications for the social security system,
for private pension plans and for insurance companies. On the one hand, for example,
Social Security does not offset, at the age of retirement, a dollar in public annuities by
reducing a dollar in the private market. In particular, the crowding out effect is lower
the greater is the wealth that is accumulated in the private market. On the other
hand, we have shown how those economic agents, who finance their consumption
through annuities, are willing to purchase actuarially unfair premiums, even to the
point of demanding annuities with half of the risk premium contingent upon her
death.
Finally, the conclusions obtained in this chapter suggest extentions of the anal-
ysis, to include different annuities, such as SPIAs or constant annuity payouts, as




In this appendix we shall present the main properties of the rational discount func-
tion or mortality hazard rate. Each property is essential both to determine the
optimal allocation and to calculate the actuarial fair annuity. Subsequently, the
proof of proposition 2.1 will be sketched.
Definition 2.1 Let Ω ∈ C2([0, T )) denote the rational discount function, which
means the probability that the consumer will be at age x. Ω has the following prop-
erties:
1. Ω(0) = 1.
2. limx→T Ω(x) = 0.
3. 0 < Ω(x) ≤ 1.





Ω(x) = µ(x) > 0.
where µ ∈ C∞([0, T )) is the instantaneous mortality rate, also known by de-
mographers as “mortality hazard rate”, or by actuaries as “force of mortality”.
6. The mortality hazard rate µ is an increasing function on age19
∂
∂x
µ(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, T ).
7. In particular, the probability of being alive at age x is given by the following
mapping:
Ω : [0, T ) → (0, 1]
x 7→ Ω(x) = e−
∫ x
0 µ(s)ds
Proof Proposition 2.1. Let there be two alternative indirect utility functions
which are labeled V and W respectively. The former depicts the utility derived by
19In general, this is not true at young ages, although it is assumed for the sake of simplicity.
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investing in actuarially fair annuities, while the latter does investing in conventional
































β(s− x) 1γ ds
)γ
. (2.7)
Where Ta(x) is equal to the initial wealth plus the present value of future earnings









and, similarly, Tc(x) is equal to the sum of the initial wealth and the present value,







Note that Ta(x) ≤ Tc(x) for all x ∈ [0, T ), because of Definition 2.1.
We aim to obtain whether or not (2.7) can be greater than (2.6). To do so, we shall
proceed dividing (2.6) over (2.7) in order to simplify the algebra.
V (x)
W (x)
= A(x)1−γ ·B(x, γ)γ , (2.8)
where




















γ β(s− x) 1γ ds
> 0.
Therefore, if (2.8) is greater (resp. less) than the unit, (2.6) is more (resp. less)
preferred than (2.7). This result depends mainly on function B(x, γ) due to A(x) is
always less or equal than one. According to this fact, we shall study the image of





> 1 if 0 < γ < 1
= 1 if γ = 1
< 1 if γ > 1
,∀x ∈ [0, T ).
In order to demonstrate that B(x, γ) is greater than one, for all 0 < γ < 1, we
study the values of the function Ω(s)
1
γ relative to Ω(s).Thus, let γ > 0, such that
γ < 1, then 1
γ
> 1. If Ω(s),∀s ∈ [0, T ), is a positive real function lower than one,
we have that Ω(s)
1
γ < Ω(s). Now, multiplying and integrating both sides of the






















β(s− x) 1γ ds.
To obtain the inequality sense of the function B(x, γ) let divide the right side of the























β(s− x) 1γ ds
> 1,∀γ ∈ (0, 1), and all x ∈ [0, T ).
On the other hand, when γ > 1 ⇒ 0 < 1
γ
< 1, which implies that Ω(s)
1
γ > Ω(s).























β(s− x) 1γ ds
< 1,∀γ > 1, and all x ∈ [0, T ).
Finally, when γ = 1, the functions Ω(s)
1
γ and Ω(s) are equal, therefore is easy to
prove that B(x, γ) = 1.
So far, we have studied the image of B(x, γ) because of its influence over (2.8).
However, we can simplify the algebra by taking logarithms on (2.8), and so, we can






= (1− γ) · ln(A(x)) + γ · ln(B(x, γ)). (2.9)
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To determine the signal of (2.9), let split the set of γ-values into three parts, such
that



















2. When γ = 1, the sense of the inequality between V (x) and W (x) is undeter-
mined. Nonetheless, V (x) > W (x) whenever Ta(x) = Tc(x).
















The following tables and figures show how under different scenarios our individual
consumes her wealth from age 65 to age 85. These data, obtained through various
simulations, help us to understand the main factors that determine whether an
individual prefers to purchase annuities or not. Thus, we will demonstrate that:
When the individual is selfish and faces an uncertain lifespan, the deci-
sion of whether or not to purchase an asset contingent upon her death
depends on the relationship between the present value of future earnings
and the initial wealth.
We have divided this subsection into two cases: men and women. We have also con-
sidered two initial wealths {150.000, 300.000}. The simulations have been obtained
by assuming that: i) the population grows at a constant rate equal to .015, ii) every
individual discounts future consumptions both subjectively and rationally, iii) the
subjective discount factor is constant over time and equal to .01, iv) the rational
discount is a survival probability function. Regarding this last assumption, we have
introduced some demographic tables, which contain the mortality hazard rates, for
four Spanish cohorts (Tables from 2.4 to 2.7).20 In particular, we have calculated the
mortality hazard rates of the Spanish cohorts born in the years 1940, 1960, 1980, and
2000. The underlying reason for considering four different cohorts is to analyze the
effects of an increment in the life expectancy on our individual’s allocation process.
On the other hand, in order to analyze the effects of the risk aversion coefficient on
the demand for annuities, we have considered three feasible values of γ: .75, 2, and
5. Finally, based on Chapter 4 we have assumed that vi) the economy can achieve
either the modified golden rule or the golden rule steady-state. As a consequence,
we simulate the allocation processes under four different stationary interest rates
20In order to estimate this data we have used the following data base:
Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute
for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de
(data downloaded on [2004]).
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(and wages) {.015, .02125, .04, and .085}. Later on, we will use these simulations
to compare the different allocation processes obtained in chapters 3 and 4.
According to the assumptions, we are able to note looking at both tables (2.13
to 2.21) and figures (2.3 to 2.50) that the decision to purchase annuities at the age
of retirement (here 65 years old) depends, not on the survival probability and the
risk aversion, but rather on the relationship between the pension benefit b, paid by
an unfunded Social Security, and the initial wealth k(65). In particular, if wealth
decreases sharply or is equal to zero, then the individual will not have purchased
annuities. In contrast, if wealth at 85 years old is positive, it will mean that our indi-
vidual will have purchased annuities. Consumption trajectories, on the other hand,
show the consequences of not purchasing annuities. For example, a consumption tra-
jectory with a steep downward-slope means that the individual has not purchased
annuities. Her consumption therefore rises at the beginning of her retirement period,
but it decreases sharply afterwards, up to the amount received in pension benefits.
A smooth consumption from age 65 to 85, by contrast, depicts an individual who
has purchased annuities. Finally, a consumption trajectory that increases rapidly
and, subsequently, decreases represents an individual who has purchased annuities
at the beginning of her retirement period, but has changed her decision afterwards.
In sum, we see that, on the one side, even though women and men have different
survival probabilities (look at figure 2.2), and so life expectancies, their decision of
purchasing annuities still depend on the relationship between the pension benefit
and the initial wealth. In order to compare the consumption trajectories of both
genders, we need to choose a table in which both the pension benefit and the initial
wealth will be similar. For example, tables 2.14 and 2.18 satisfy this condition.
Thus, if we compare figures from 2.9 to 2.14 with those from 2.27 to 2.32, we will
see that consumption trajectories are similar. On the other side, besides the lack of
influence of the survival probability upon the demand for annuities, we also realize
from the figures and tables below that the risk aversion coefficient is not the main
factor to analyze. Concretely, the risk aversion only postpones current consumption
to a future date. However, it does not modify the decision of purchasing annuities;
33
for examples, see figures from 2.3 to 2.5.
34
Table 2.4: Survival Curves: Men
1940 1960 1980 2000
Age lx ex lx ex lx ex lx ex
65 28779 10.53 69382 12.92 76905 14.61 81932 16.77
70 20175 8.01 58518 9.95 67075 11.35 74234 13.24
75 11649 6.09 44377 7.46 53532 8.61 63055 10.12
80 5020 4.67 28486 5.52 36966 6.35 48101 7.45
85 1558 3.48 14113 4.05 20263 4.64 30308 5.35
90 277 2.90 4824 3.16 7813 3.44 13968 3.81
95 39 2.13 1148 2.29 1916 2.60 4080 2.75
100 2 1.74 141 1.82 260 2.01 645 2.05
105 0 1.49 9 1.51 18 1.63 49 1.62
110 0 1.34 0 1.34 1 1.42 2 1.39
lx the number of surviving members (from a sample of 100000 people)
of the cohort at age x.
ex expectation of future life beyond age x.
Table 2.5: Mortality Hazard Rates (Men): µ(x) =
αeβx
log(α) β
Year Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
1940 -7.464593 (.247149) .068561 (.002916)
1960 -8.693344 (.145519) .080501 (.001696)
1980 -9.291359 (.114363) .085277 (.001324)
2000 -10.131433 (.101554) .092800 (.001169)
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Table 2.6: Survival Curves: Women
1940 1960 1980 2000
Age lx ex lx ex lx ex lx ex
65 50973 12.66 78754 15.21 87957 17.86 92215 20.54
70 42726 9.63 70289 11.72 82095 13.94 88395 16.31
75 30680 7.46 57190 8.80 72295 10.46 81915 12.39
80 18838 5.69 39768 6.52 56928 7.57 70594 8.94
85 9201 4.32 22012 4.80 36295 5.42 51836 6.22
90 3220 3.41 8727 3.64 16994 3.88 28511 4.24
95 890 2.69 2430 2.65 5126 2.82 9793 2.99
100 136 2.19 355 2.05 854 2.10 1831 2.12
105 13 1.83 27 1.66 69 1.65 150 1.61
110 1 1.62 1 1.44 3 1.41 5 1.36
lx the number of surviving members (from a sample of 100000 people)
of the cohort at age x.
ex expectation of future life beyond age x.
Table 2.7: Mortality Hazard Rates (Women): µ(x) =
αeβx
log(α) β
Year Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
1940 -8.136371 (.285225) .073050 (.003344)
1960 -9.663813 (.167940) .088782 (.001945)
1980 -11.121971 (.164062) .102784 (.001888)
2000 -12.529926 (.175215) .115683 (.001992)
36
Figure 2.2: Survival Curves for Different Spanish Cohorts







































Table 2.8: Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Men): 1940 and 1960
Mature 1940 1960
Age Assets Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75 Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
65 .0150 .0627 .0508 .0389 .0269 .0452 .0376 .0301 .0225
66 .0150 .0661 .0533 .0406 .0278 .0477 .0395 .0314 .0232
67 .0150 .0697 .0561 .0424 .0287 .0504 .0416 .0327 .0239
68 .0150 .0736 .0590 .0443 .0297 .0534 .0438 .0342 .0246
69 .0150 .0778 .0621 .0464 .0307 .0566 .0462 .0358 .0254
70 .0150 .0822 .0654 .0486 .0318 .0601 .0488 .0376 .0263
71 .0150 .0870 .0690 .0510 .0330 .0639 .0517 .0395 .0272
72 .0150 .0921 .0728 .0536 .0343 .0680 .0548 .0415 .0283
73 .0150 .0976 .0770 .0563 .0357 .0725 .0581 .0437 .0294
74 .0150 .1035 .0813 .0592 .0371 .0773 .0617 .0461 .0306
75 .0150 .1097 .0861 .0624 .0387 .0825 .0656 .0487 .0319
76 .0150 .1165 .0911 .0657 .0404 .0881 .0699 .0516 .0333
77 .0150 .1237 .0965 .0693 .0422 .0943 .0745 .0546 .0348
78 .0150 .1314 .1023 .0732 .0441 .1009 .0794 .0580 .0365
79 .0150 .1396 .1085 .0773 .0462 .1081 .0848 .0616 .0383
80 .0150 .1485 .1151 .0817 .0484 .1159 .0907 .0655 .0402
81 .0150 .1580 .1222 .0865 .0507 .1244 .0971 .0697 .0424
82 .0150 .1681 .1298 .0915 .0533 .1336 .1039 .0743 .0446
83 .0150 .1790 .1380 .0970 .0560 .1435 .1114 .0793 .0471
84 .0150 .1906 .1467 .1028 .0589 .1543 .1195 .0846 .0498
85 .0150 .2031 .1560 .1090 .0620 .1660 .1282 .0905 .0527
86 .0150 .2164 .1661 .1157 .0654 .1786 .1377 .0968 .0559
87 .0150 .2307 .1768 .1228 .0689 .1923 .1480 .1037 .0593
88 .0150 .2460 .1883 .1305 .0728 .2072 .1591 .1111 .0630
89 .0150 .2624 .2006 .1387 .0769 .2233 .1712 .1192 .0671
90 .0150 .2800 .2137 .1475 .0812 .2408 .1843 .1279 .0714
91 .0150 .2988 .2278 .1569 .0859 .2597 .1985 .1373 .0762
92 .0150 .3189 .2429 .1669 .0910 .2802 .2139 .1476 .0813
93 .0150 .3405 .2591 .1777 .0964 .3024 .2306 .1587 .0869
94 .0150 .3636 .2764 .1893 .1021 .3265 .2487 .1708 .0929
95 .0150 .3883 .2950 .2016 .1083 .3527 .2682 .1838 .0994
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Table 2.9: Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Men): 1980 and 2000
Mature 1980 2000
Age Assets Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75 Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
65 .0150 .0376 .0319 .0263 .0206 .0308 .0269 .0229 .0190
66 .0150 .0396 .0334 .0273 .0211 .0324 .0280 .0237 .0193
67 .0150 .0418 .0351 .0284 .0217 .0341 .0293 .0245 .0198
68 .0150 .0442 .0369 .0296 .0223 .0359 .0307 .0255 .0202
69 .0150 .0468 .0388 .0309 .0229 .0380 .0322 .0265 .0207
70 .0150 .0496 .0409 .0323 .0236 .0402 .0339 .0276 .0213
71 .0150 .0527 .0432 .0338 .0244 .0426 .0357 .0288 .0219
72 .0150 .0560 .0458 .0355 .0253 .0453 .0377 .0302 .0226
73 .0150 .0597 .0485 .0373 .0262 .0483 .0400 .0316 .0233
74 .0150 .0636 .0515 .0393 .0272 .0515 .0424 .0333 .0241
75 .0150 .0680 .0547 .0415 .0282 .0551 .0450 .0350 .0250
76 .0150 .0727 .0583 .0438 .0294 .0590 .0480 .0370 .0260
77 .0150 .0778 .0621 .0464 .0307 .0632 .0512 .0391 .0271
78 .0150 .0834 .0663 .0492 .0321 .0679 .0547 .0415 .0282
79 .0150 .0895 .0709 .0523 .0336 .0731 .0585 .0440 .0295
80 .0150 .0961 .0759 .0556 .0353 .0787 .0628 .0469 .0309
81 .0150 .1034 .0813 .0592 .0371 .0849 .0674 .0500 .0325
82 .0150 .1112 .0872 .0631 .0391 .0917 .0725 .0533 .0342
83 .0150 .1198 .0936 .0674 .0412 .0992 .0781 .0571 .0360
84 .0150 .1291 .1006 .0721 .0435 .1073 .0843 .0612 .0381
85 .0150 .1393 .1082 .0771 .0461 .1163 .0910 .0657 .0403
86 .0150 .1504 .1165 .0827 .0488 .1262 .0984 .0706 .0428
87 .0150 .1624 .1256 .0887 .0519 .1370 .1065 .0760 .0455
88 .0150 .1755 .1354 .0953 .0551 .1488 .1154 .0819 .0485
89 .0150 .1898 .1461 .1024 .0587 .1619 .1251 .0884 .0517
90 .0150 .2054 .1578 .1102 .0626 .1761 .1359 .0956 .0553
91 .0150 .2223 .1705 .1187 .0668 .1918 .1476 .1034 .0592
92 .0150 .2408 .1843 .1279 .0714 .2090 .1605 .1120 .0635
93 .0150 .2609 .1994 .1379 .0765 .2279 .1747 .1214 .0682
94 .0150 .2828 .2158 .1489 .0819 .2486 .1902 .1318 .0734
95 .0150 .3066 .2337 .1608 .0879 .2713 .2072 .1431 .0791
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Table 2.10: Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Women): 1940 and 1960
Mature 1940 1960
Age Assets Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75 Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
65 .0150 .0476 .0394 .0313 .0231 .0345 .0296 .0248 .0199
66 .0150 .0500 .0413 .0325 .0238 .0363 .0310 .0257 .0203
67 .0150 .0527 .0433 .0338 .0244 .0383 .0325 .0266 .0208
68 .0150 .0555 .0454 .0353 .0251 .0405 .0341 .0277 .0214
69 .0150 .0586 .0477 .0368 .0259 .0428 .0359 .0289 .0220
70 .0150 .0619 .0502 .0385 .0267 .0454 .0378 .0302 .0226
71 .0150 .0655 .0529 .0402 .0276 .0482 .0399 .0316 .0233
72 .0150 .0693 .0557 .0422 .0286 .0513 .0422 .0332 .0241
73 .0150 .0734 .0588 .0442 .0296 .0547 .0448 .0348 .0249
74 .0150 .0779 .0621 .0464 .0307 .0584 .0475 .0367 .0258
75 .0150 .0826 .0657 .0488 .0319 .0624 .0505 .0387 .0268
76 .0150 .0877 .0696 .0514 .0332 .0668 .0538 .0409 .0279
77 .0150 .0933 .0737 .0541 .0346 .0716 .0575 .0433 .0292
78 .0150 .0992 .0781 .0571 .0360 .0769 .0614 .0459 .0305
79 .0150 .1056 .0829 .0603 .0376 .0826 .0657 .0488 .0319
80 .0150 .1124 .0881 .0637 .0394 .0889 .0704 .0519 .0335
81 .0150 .1198 .0936 .0674 .0412 .0957 .0756 .0554 .0352
82 .0150 .1278 .0996 .0714 .0432 .1032 .0812 .0591 .0371
83 .0150 .1363 .1060 .0756 .0453 .1114 .0873 .0632 .0391
84 .0150 .1455 .1129 .0802 .0476 .1204 .0940 .0677 .0413
85 .0150 .1554 .1203 .0852 .0501 .1302 .1014 .0726 .0438
86 .0150 .1660 .1283 .0905 .0528 .1409 .1094 .0779 .0465
87 .0150 .1775 .1368 .0962 .0556 .1525 .1182 .0838 .0494
88 .0150 .1898 .1461 .1024 .0587 .1653 .1277 .0902 .0526
89 .0150 .2030 .1560 .1090 .0620 .1793 .1382 .0971 .0561
90 .0150 .2173 .1667 .1161 .0656 .1945 .1496 .1048 .0599
91 .0150 .2326 .1782 .1238 .0694 .2112 .1621 .1131 .0640
92 .0150 .2491 .1906 .1320 .0735 .2294 .1758 .1222 .0686
93 .0150 .2668 .2039 .1409 .0780 .2493 .1907 .1322 .0736
94 .0150 .2859 .2182 .1505 .0827 .2711 .2070 .1430 .0790
95 .0150 .3064 .2336 .1607 .0879 .2948 .2249 .1549 .0850
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Table 2.11: Annuity Yields for the Cohorts (Women): 1980 and 2000
Mature 1980 2000
Age Assets Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75 Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
65 .0150 .0262 .0234 .0206 .0178 .0213 .0197 .0181 .0166
66 .0150 .0274 .0243 .0212 .0181 .0221 .0203 .0185 .0168
67 .0150 .0288 .0253 .0219 .0184 .0229 .0210 .0190 .0170
68 .0150 .0302 .0264 .0226 .0188 .0239 .0217 .0195 .0172
69 .0150 .0319 .0277 .0234 .0192 .0250 .0225 .0200 .0175
70 .0150 .0337 .0290 .0244 .0197 .0262 .0234 .0206 .0178
71 .0150 .0357 .0306 .0254 .0202 .0276 .0245 .0213 .0182
72 .0150 .0380 .0322 .0265 .0207 .0292 .0256 .0221 .0185
73 .0150 .0405 .0341 .0277 .0214 .0309 .0269 .0229 .0190
74 .0150 .0432 .0362 .0291 .0221 .0328 .0284 .0239 .0195
75 .0150 .0463 .0385 .0307 .0228 .0350 .0300 .0250 .0200
76 .0150 .0497 .0410 .0323 .0237 .0375 .0319 .0262 .0206
77 .0150 .0534 .0438 .0342 .0246 .0402 .0339 .0276 .0213
78 .0150 .0576 .0470 .0363 .0257 .0433 .0362 .0292 .0221
79 .0150 .0622 .0504 .0386 .0268 .0468 .0389 .0309 .0230
80 .0150 .0673 .0542 .0412 .0281 .0507 .0418 .0329 .0239
81 .0150 .0730 .0585 .0440 .0295 .0551 .0451 .0350 .0250
82 .0150 .0793 .0632 .0471 .0311 .0600 .0487 .0375 .0262
83 .0150 .0862 .0684 .0506 .0328 .0655 .0529 .0403 .0276
84 .0150 .0939 .0742 .0545 .0347 .0717 .0575 .0434 .0292
85 .0150 .1025 .0806 .0587 .0369 .0787 .0627 .0468 .0309
86 .0150 .1120 .0877 .0635 .0392 .0865 .0686 .0507 .0329
87 .0150 .1225 .0956 .0687 .0419 .0952 .0752 .0551 .0351
88 .0150 .1341 .1043 .0745 .0448 .1051 .0826 .0600 .0375
89 .0150 .1470 .1140 .0810 .0480 .1161 .0908 .0656 .0403
90 .0150 .1613 .1247 .0881 .0516 .1285 .1001 .0718 .0434
91 .0150 .1771 .1366 .0960 .0555 .1424 .1106 .0787 .0469
92 .0150 .1946 .1497 .1048 .0599 .1581 .1223 .0865 .0508
93 .0150 .2141 .1643 .1145 .0648 .1756 .1355 .0953 .0552
94 .0150 .2356 .1805 .1253 .0702 .1953 .1502 .1052 .0601
95 .0150 .2595 .1984 .1373 .0761 .2174 .1668 .1162 .0656
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Table 2.12: Pension Benefits (Men):
Unfunded Social Security
Cohort
γ r∗ 1940 1960 1980 2000
.75 .0150 34.656 21.709 17.510 14.326
.0213 33.379 20.909 16.865 13.798
2 .0150 34.656 21.709 17.510 14.326
.0400 31.041 19.444 15.683 12.831
5 .0150 34.656 21.709 17.510 14.326
.0850 28.234 17.686 14.265 11.671
Parameters: payroll tax τ equals .08; population
growth rate n = .015; δ = .01; J = 65 and a




We have used in this table the following formulae:
• Golden Rule: r∗ = n.
• Modified Golden Rule: r∗ = δ + γn.






, where x := {1940, 1960, 1980, 2000}.
• Wage: w∗ = φ(r∗).
Tables 2.12 and 2.17 below report pension benefits that correspond to an individual
(either men or women) who belongs to an economy with a specific survival prob-
ability. Let note, as both factor prices are under stationary conditions, that there
exists a negative relationship between the pension benefit and the cohort that our
individual belongs. That is, the greater the life expectancy is, the lower the benefit
becomes. According to the results reported in tables 2.12 and 2.17, we find that the
higher the stationary interest rate is, the lower both the stationary wage and the
pension benefit is. Consequently, attending to proposition 2.1 we expect that, under
stationary conditions, the greater the interest rate is, the greater the willingness of
purchasing annuities becomes.
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Table 2.13: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 1940
γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 33.379
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 31.041
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 278.516 0 146.632 0 112.941 0 112.941
k(75) 0 252.956 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 224.988 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 196.299 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 174344 0 108.672 0 108.672 0 108.672
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 28.234
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 148.051 286.396 145.641 283.755 142.682 281.002 138.094 273.315
k(75) 142.047 267.052 136.168 260.042 128.995 252.587 117.944 242.601
k(80) 132.683 243.361 122.228 230.148 109.632 216.018 62.089 197.106
k(85) 120.920 217.059 104.869 195.924 85.985 173.571 0 143.836
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.3: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656}

























Figure 2.4: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656}

























Figure 2.5: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 34.656}



























Figure 2.6: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 33.379}























Figure 2.7: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 31.041}






















Figure 2.8: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 28.234}

























Table 2.14: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 1960
γ = .75 and r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 20.909
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 93.688 0 93.688 0 93.688 0 93.688
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 19.444
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 141.449 274.009 64.663 267.730 64.663 209.149 64.663 189.765
k(75) 59.532 243.741 0 223.548 0 82.992 0 67.916
k(80) 0 211.147 0 177.619 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 178.293 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 52.074 244.794 52.074 242.432 52.074 179.147 52.074 179.147
k(75) 0 195.202 0 130.335 0 59.617 0 59.617
k(80) 0 152.098 0 1.599 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 115.915 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 17.686
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 145.494 284.183 145.043 284.303 144.549 284.789 143.618 285.495
k(75) 136.802 261.701 135.076 260.527 133.124 259.944 129.942 259.455
k(80) 124.651 234.085 120.637 229.856 116.058 226.218 108.997 221.994
k(85) 110.148 203.455 102.786 194.298 94.423 185.559 77.366 174.934
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.9: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709}

























Figure 2.10: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709}


























Figure 2.11: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 21.709}
























Figure 2.12: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 20.909}
























Figure 2.13: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 19.444}






















Figure 2.14: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 17.686}


























Table 2.15: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 1980
γ = .75 and r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 28.431 0 28.431 0 28.431 0 28.431
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 16.865
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 73.855 0 73.855 0 73.855 0 73.855
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 22.867 141.825 22.867 141.825 22.867 141.825 22.867 141.825
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 15.683
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 141.267 274.723 88.944 268.382 88.944 260.692 88.944 217.796
k(75) 128.964 244.647 17.751 230.334 17.751 197.241 17.751 121.787
k(80) 114.094 211.684 0 187.999 0 75.451 0 19.485
k(85) 96.053 177.998 0 144.121 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 75.962 246.138 75.962 245.167 75.962 204.777 75.962 204.777
k(75) 1.680 196.964 1.680 194.066 1.680 108.688 1.680 108.688
k(80) 0 153.598 0 147.992 0 15.226 0 15.226
k(85) 0 116.756 0 41.279 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 14.265
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 145.865 285.805 146.053 286.850 146.328 288.365 146.495 290.379
k(75) 137.411 264.388 137.128 265.341 136.934 267.165 136.300 269.819
k(80) 125.228 237.060 123.570 236.323 121.861 236.670 119.025 237.767
k(85) 110.375 205.898 106.296 201.605 101.874 198.357 95.211 195.165
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.15: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510}























Figure 2.16: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510}
























Figure 2.17: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 17.510}























Figure 2.18: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 16.865}






















Figure 2.19: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 15.683}
























Figure 2.20: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 14.265}

























Table 2.16: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Men) 2000
γ = .75 and r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 94.633 0 94.633 0 94.633 0 94.633
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 13.798
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 19.086 130.630 19.086 130.630 19.086 130.630 19.086 130.630
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 54.211 249.358 54.211 176.191 54.211 176.191 54.211 176.191
k(75) 0 120.609 0 54.532 0 54.532 0 54.532
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 12.831
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 141.185 275.442 137.974 271.504 106.127 266.682 106.127 238.368
k(75) 128.581 245.347 104.211 235.946 51.732 224.722 51.732 162.013
k(80) 113.144 211.610 30.767 195.222 0 169.805 0 75.401
k(85) 96.140 176.565 0 151.994 0 52.682 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 92.296 247.287 92.296 247.435 92.296 247.259 92.296 222.576
k(75) 33.230 198.263 33.230 197.560 33.230 177.343 33.230 142.940
k(80) 0 154.322 0 151.839 0 91.262 0 63.454
k(85) 0 116.526 0 111.553 0 9.075 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 11.671
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 146.359 287.503 147.032 289.269 147.867 291.553 148.791 294.483
k(75) 138.131 267.032 138.990 269.727 140.139 273.462 141.356 278.473
k(80) 125.756 239.634 126.016 241.857 126.589 245.512 126.960 250.822
k(85) 110.257 207.373 108.901 207.283 107.712 208.750 105.661 211.705
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.21: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326}






















Figure 2.22: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326}
























Figure 2.23: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 14.326}























Figure 2.24: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 13.798}

























Figure 2.25: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 12.831}
























Figure 2.26: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 11.671}

























Table 2.17: Unfunded Pension Benefits
(Women)
Cohort
γ r 1940 1960 1980 2000
.75 .0150 22.980 16.031 12.463 10.418
.0213 22.134 15.441 12.004 10.034
2 .0150 22.980 16.031 12.463 10.418
.0400 20.583 14.359 11.163 9.331
5 .0150 22.980 16.031 12.463 10.418
.0850 18.722 13.061 10.153 8.487
Parameters: payroll tax τ equals .08; population
growth rate n = .015; δ = .01; J = 65 and a




We have used in this table the following formulae:
• Golden Rule: r∗ = n.
• Modified Golden Rule: r∗ = δ + γn.






, where x := {1940, 1960, 1980, 2000}.
• Wage: w∗ = φ(r∗).
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Table 2.18: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 1940
γ = .75 and r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 22.134
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 90.830 0 90.830 0 90.830 0 90.830
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 20.583
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 143.904 278.172 63.762 267.894 63.762 225.193 63.762 189.509
k(75) 134.330 252.095 0 229.971 0 96.826 0 68.755
k(80) 36.989 223.338 0 188.270 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 193.593 0 39.633 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 53.300 248.151 53.300 245.152 53.300 181.204 53.300 181.204
k(75) 0 201.351 0 192.524 0 64.484 0 64.484
k(80) 0 160.274 0 55.918 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 125.259 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 18.722
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 147.473 287.623 146.750 287.285 145.942 287.256 144.632 287.352
k(75) 141.052 269.115 138.814 267.104 136.274 265.577 132.374 263.957
k(80) 131.264 245.617 126.559 240.304 121.189 235.460 113.174 229.797
k(85) 118.951 218.760 110.773 208.404 101.492 198.368 87.883 186.238
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.27: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980}

























Figure 2.28: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980}






















Figure 2.29: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 22.980}
























Figure 2.30: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 22.134}
























Figure 2.31: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 20.583}


























Figure 2.32: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 18.722}


























Table 2.19: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 1960
γ = .75 and r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 58.743 0 58.743 0 58.743 0 58.743
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 15.441
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 0 99.751 0 99.751 0 99.751 0 99.751
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 37.168 157.360 37.168 157.360 37.168 157.360 37.168 157.360
k(75) 0 20.043 0 20.043 0 20.043 0 20.043
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 14.359
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 141.038 274.693 117.470 269.467 96.698 263.111 96.698 226.939
k(75) 128.420 244.286 49.925 232.230 32.934 217.930 32.934 139.470
k(80) 113.149 210.722 0 190.363 0 114.803 0 43.785
k(85) 96.480 176.270 0 146.613 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 83.262 246.355 83.262 245.919 83.262 221.545 83.262 212.642
k(75) 15.704 197.031 15.704 195.162 15.704 131.169 15.704 123.735
k(80) 0 153.281 0 149.118 0 42.219 0 36.273
k(85) 0 115.974 0 85.547 0 0 0 0
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 13.061
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 145.908 286.231 146.332 287.630 146.881 289.527 147.420 292.003
k(75) 137.365 264.885 137.622 266.662 138.065 269.398 138.313 273.189
k(80) 124.922 237.207 124.148 237.829 123.493 239.702 122.145 242.756
k(85) 109.646 205.320 106.798 202.911 103.838 201.776 99.265 201.351
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.33: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031}























Figure 2.34: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031}























Figure 2.35: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 16.031}























Figure 2.36: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 15.441}


























Figure 2.37: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 14.359}
























Figure 2.38: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 13.061}

























Table 2.20: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 1980
γ = .75 and r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 20.289 131.903 20.289 131.903 20.289 131.903 20.289 131.903
k(75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 12.004
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 46.843 162.749 46.843 162.749 46.843 162.749 46.843 162.749
k(75) 0 23.652 0 23.652 0 23.652 0 23.652
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 70.678 249.541 70.678 194.515 70.678 194.515 70.678 194.515
k(75) 0 192.783 0 88.038 0 88.038 0 88.038
k(80) 0 62.417 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 11.163
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 140.907 275.469 138.778 273.082 115.205 270.069 115.205 249.569
k(75) 127.695 244.589 122.607 238.419 69.806 230.894 69.806 183.994
k(80) 111.323 209.306 71.161 197.793 15.860 184.247 15.860 105.976
k(85) 93.180 172.242 0 153.965 0 98.129 0 22.400
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 100.250 247.569 100.250 248.432 100.250 249.169 100.250 231.261
k(75) 48.547 198.013 48.547 198.742 48.547 199.094 48.547 159.560
k(80) 0 153.010 0 152.588 0 121.488 0 86.657
k(85) 0 113.994 0 111.544 0 42.356 0 15.563
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 10.153
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 146.590 288.418 147.552 290.630 148.710 293.369 150.044 296.809
k(75) 138.203 267.974 139.776 271.799 141.740 276.740 144.016 283.162
k(80) 125.159 239.506 126.647 243.694 128.647 249.509 130.922 257.451
k(85) 108.517 205.182 108.911 207.888 109.770 212.470 110.519 219.345
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.39: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463}

























Figure 2.40: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463}























Figure 2.41: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 12.463}



























Figure 2.42: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 12.004}























Figure 2.43: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 11.163}























Figure 2.44: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 10.153}
























Table 2.21: Initial Wealth Path from 65 to 85 years old. Cohort
(Women) 2000
γ = .75 and r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 57.423 175.173 57.423 175.173 57.423 175.173 57.423 175.173
k(75) 0 50.200 0 50.200 0 50.200 0 50.200
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = .75 and r∗ = .02125, b = 10.034
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 78.324 200.566 78.324 200.566 78.324 200.566 78.324 200.566
k(75) 0 91.363 0 91.363 0 91.363 0 91.363
k(80) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k(85) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 90.238 252.098 90.238 217.077 90.238 217.077 90.238 217.077
k(75) 28.108 204.830 28.108 130.620 28.108 130.620 28.108 130.620
k(80) 0 160.086 0 43.920 0 43.920 0 43.920
k(85) 0 55.164 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ = 2 and r∗ = .0400, b = 9.331
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 141.989 278.158 140.964 277.339 126.466 276.157 126.466 273.886
k(75) 129.412 248.841 126.716 246.133 93.100 242.590 93.100 224.298
k(80) 113.011 213.648 107.827 207.629 50.294 200.228 50.294 158.179
k(85) 94.146 175.221 64.955 164.311 755 151.579 755 81.416
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 125.347 250.209 110.585 251.670 110.585 253.175 110.585 243.060
k(75) 93.893 201.752 68.883 203.843 68.883 205.937 68.883 182.690
k(80) 46.387 156.458 25.692 158.192 25.692 159.751 25.691 119.867
k(85) 0 116.173 0 116.555 0 96.729 0 56.524
γ = 5 and r∗ = .0850, b = 8.487
Fair ̟ = .25 ̟ = .50 ̟ = .75
k(65) 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000 150.000 300.000
k(70) 148.186 292.043 149.343 294.510 150.706 297.468 152.303 301.110
k(75) 141.085 274.429 143.274 279.176 145.916 285.033 149.068 292.449
k(80) 128.612 247.230 131.356 253.404 134.786 261.331 138.948 271.742
k(85) 111.575 212.180 113.986 218.151 117.198 226.342 121.134 237.668
̟ annuity load charged to the consumer.
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Figure 2.45: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418}






















Figure 2.46: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418}






















Figure 2.47: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0150, b = 10.418}


























Figure 2.48: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = .75, r∗ = .0213, b = 10.034}






















Figure 2.49: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 2, r∗ = .0400, b = 9.331}






















Figure 2.50: Consumption Trajectories. Case: {γ = 5, r∗ = .0850, b = 8.487}




























This chapter focuses on comparing public and private individual
wealth over the life-cycle, when individuals face an uncertain length of
life. We also analyze how a fully funded and actuarially fair Social Se-
curity affects the desire to annuitize private wealth. Within this frame-
work, we find that a social security system can contribute to reaching
a higher national wealth, even when the economy is composed of selfish
individuals. Thus, by means of some simulations we obtain the result
that a payroll tax of 6 percent increases individual wealth up to 17 per-
cent. This increment, however, is obtained under the assumption that
insurance companies offer fair annuities. On the contrary, under an un-
fair private annuity market, individual wealth can decrease around 10
percent for the same payroll tax.
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3.1 Introduction
It has been well known since Feldstein (1974)1 that Social Security crowds out
private saving. The intensity of this crowding out effect varies according to how
Social Security is financed, the behavior of each individual in the economy, and the
return yielded by public and private pensions.
First, we know that the negative impact of a funded social security system on
steady-state capital stock is smaller, or zero, than that yielded by an unfunded
system. Thus for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (1999),
and Conesa and Krueger (1999) estimate under an unfunded Social Security that
steady-state capital stock is reduced between 11 and 25 percent. On the contrary,
under a funded Social Security and lifetime uncertainty, Eckstein et al. (1985), Abel
(1985), and Hubbard (1987) demonstrate that the crowding out only occurs when
selfish individuals have neither access to the annuity market, nor actuarially fair
annuities.
Second, individual feelings can influence the intensity of the crowding out effect
as well. In particular, the more altruistic an agent is, the greater her saving and,
therefore, her wealth is. Hence, Fuster (1999) finds that an unfunded social security
system with two-sided altruistic agents crowds out only 8 percent of the capital
stock for a 44 percent replacement rate. Note that this value is much lower than
those estimated for selfish individuals by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), among
others. Nevertheless, there does not exist a consensus among economists regarding
the importance of altruistic feelings on individual’s behavior. Thus, we shall assume
that our individual is selfish hereinafter.
Third, it has also been quantified that Social Security does not reduce the stock of
capital in the long-run, so long as public and private pensions yield the same return.
Unfortunately, this result has been obtained assuming that the decision of purchasing
annuities is exogenous. As a consequence, we cannot derive any relationship between
1This negative effect was found firstly by Feldstein (1974) in the case of an unfunded Social
Security.
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the desire to purchase annuities and wealth over time.
In this chapter, we analyze how the wealth accumulation process is affected when
both the Social Security is funded and individuals endogenously purchase annuities.
To do so, we develop an economy that incorporates financial companies, private
insurances, and a funded Social Security. Consequently, individuals can invest their
wealth in safe assets, risky assets, and annuities. Moreover, in order to make the
decision of purchasing annuities endogenous, we have made the following five as-
sumptions: i) our individual faces an uncertain lifespan, ii) the yield of annuities
dominates that of bonds, iii) a negative asset position at the time of death is for-
bidden, iv) the consumer is selfish, and v) she has a bounded rationality (i.e., even
though financial institutions do not allow individuals to die in debt, our agent does
not make decisions considering this constraint). Under the first four assumptions,
Yaari (1965) states that the consumer will fully annuitize her savings. However,
Sanchez-Romero (2005) demonstrates, by adding the assumption number v), that
the decision of purchasing annuities depends on the relationship between the present
value of future non-capital earnings and the initial wealth. That is to say, he finds
that private annuities are not purchased when public benefits are high. Therefore,
this last finding suggests that the crowding out effect should be analyzed not only
by studying what sort of social security system the economy has, but also whether
individuals are willing to purchase annuities or not.
On the other hand, the implications of these five assumptions are consistent with
the fact that the demand for annuities is small on average. Nonetheless, there are
other factors that explain the lack of annuitization, although they are out of the
scope of this chapter. For example, bequest motive, annuity market imperfections
such as the irreversibility of annuitization, or even risk sharing within families. The
importance of any of these factors is, besides our assumption number v), that wealth
accumulated at the age of retirement may change. This is in addition to the fact that
wealth inequality, among descendants of people recently deceased, might increase
over time.
Finally, it is worth noting that the utility function and the dynamic optimization
70
method used throughout the chapter to calculate the optimal portfolio differ from
previous analysis. Thus, instead of using a CRRA utility function and the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman method, as Merton (1971) and Richard (1975) have done before, we
use a mean-variance utility and the Lagrange method, in order to be consistent with
the bounded rationality assumption. Under this setting, we find two important
features. One, the optimal portfolio is affected by age. Second, the investment
in risky assets is much lower than those obtained by Merton (1971). Therefore,
the investment in safe assets is preferred according to this model than in previous
analyses.
Throughout the chapter we show that, when there is no Social Security or the
payroll tax is equal to zero, our individual invests her wealth both in equities and in
annuities. On the contrary, as the Social Security payroll tax increases, our agent
is more willing to purchase bonds instead of annuities. According to this fact, we
find that an actuarially fair funded social security system could increase the stock
of capital in the long run if, and only if, our agent only purchases bonds at the
beginning of her life-cycle. We simulate that the wealth increment, with a 6 percent
payroll tax and private fair annuities, is close to 17 percent. However, under a
private unfair annuity market this wealth increment is reduced, even to the point of
decreasing wealth in the long run.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 explains the
consumer’s behavior when there is no Social Security. Here, we obtain the optimal
portfolio choice with the intention of subsequently estimating how wealth evolves
over time. In section 3.3, we introduce a funded social security system. It will enable
us to calculate how public and private wealth evolve according to different payroll
taxes. Section 3.4 describes the effects of a funded social security system on the
demand for private annuities. Furthermore, we shall distinguish between actuarially
fair annuities and unfair annuities. In Section 3.5 we make our final conclusions.
An Appendix containing a detailed demonstration of optimal investments under
different theories as well as consumption behaviors is located throughout Sections
3.6 and 3.7. Some simulations finish the chapter.
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3.2 Optimal Portfolio Choice under Uncertain Lifetime:
Bonds, Equities, and Annuities
Individuals, who finance their future consumption using annuities, reduce the crowd-
ing out effect that is caused by an actuarially fair funded social security system, Abel
(1986). Unfortunately, empirical research indicates that the value of the demand for
annuities is small on average. Therefore, to substitute an unfunded Social Security
by a funded one does not necessarily eliminate the crowding out effect.
A recent paper by Davidoff et al. (2005) suggests, among other reasons, that the
lack of the demand for annuities may be caused by behavioral biases. Building on this
idea, Sanchez-Romero (2005) proves that individuals with behavioral biases, such as
bounded rationality, are more willing to purchase annuities the greater wealth is in
relation to future non-capital earnings. Hence, ceteris paribus, we can expect that
an actuarially fair funded Social Security causes a higher crowding out in economies
with low private wealth.
The aim of this section, therefore, is to derive how individuals who live in an
economy without Social Security accumulate assets to finance their future consump-
tion at retirement. This result will be used as a benchmark to compare to the asset
accumulation process derived by introducing a social security system. We develop
an economy composed of financial companies which supply safe and risky assets (e.g.
bonds and equities) and private insurances that offer annuities. The significance of
the introduction of equities into the model is twofold. First, an economic model
which studies private pensions needs to take into account how bonds and equities
evolve. Second, if the agent has perfect foresight and short-selling is not constrained,
then this model yields a greater accumulation of wealth which may lead to an in-
crease in the demand for annuities. This point will be analyzed at the end of this
section.
The representative economic agent faces an uncertain lifetime. Her survival prob-
ability Ω is known in advance, but the age that she will die is unknown. T is the
maximum age to which the agent can survive. In addition, our economic agent has
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three key features which affect her investment decision making. First, the consumer
is selfish. She does not leave an intentional bequest at death. Second, following
Sanchez-Romero (2005), the agent does not take into account that financial institu-
tions do not allow individuals to die in debt. So, we can say that our agent has a
bounded rationality. This assumption affects the demand for annuities. For exam-
ple, in order to anticipate consumption, individuals purchase annuities when they
are young, and reject using annuities when they are retired. Third, the individual
temporarily modifies her consumption according to financial markets expectations.
Concretely, she increases her consumption while she expects to gain money investing
in financial markets. This last assumption makes the consumption decision stochas-
tic. Thus, instead of using an expected utility function, we use a mean-variance util-
ity v(c, σ2c ), which satisfies the conditions demonstrated in Tsiang (1972). Therefore,






β(s− x)v (c(s, x), σ2c (s, x)) ds, for all x ∈ [0, T ). (3.1)
Where c(s, x) is the mean consumption at age s, of an x year old consumer, σ2c (s, x)
is the consumption variance at age s, of an x year old consumer. The function v is
at least twice differentiable, strictly increasing in c(s, x), and decreasing in σ2c (s, x).
Ω(s)
Ω(x) is the probability that an individual of age x will be alive at age s, and β(s−x)
is the time discount factor from age x to age s, or e−δ(s−x),∀δ ≥ 0.
Given a mean consumption level, the utility function (3.26) shows that the higher
the consumption risk is, the lower the utility achieved by the consumer is. Hence,
assuming that consumption variance is caused by risky asset investments, the con-
sumer will maximize her consumption by investing in an efficient portfolio with the
minimum variance and maximum expected return, as Sharpe (1964) and Markowitz
(1952) suggest.
There are two alternative portfolios. The first one is composed by bonds and
equities. The second one is composed by annuities and equities. Bonds and equities
yield a safe interest rate r and a random interest rate α, respectively. Annuities, on
the contrary, are lotteries contingent on the consumer mortality risk. Specifically,
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if the consumer survives at the end of the period, she will receive the safe interest
rate r plus a risk premium µ contingent on her mortality risk. But, if she does not
survive at the end of the period, she will not receive anything.
Each period, our representative individual has an initial wealth k and a labor
income y. The individual takes y(s),∀s ∈ [0, T ) as given. These resources are
allocated to both consumption and investment. Nonetheless, she must choose the
portfolio in which she will compound her resources. Thus, the agent at age x faces















((α(s)− r(s))e(s, x) + y(s)− c(s, x)) ds = 0. (3.3)
(3.2) and (3.3) are respectively the budget constraint when consumption is financed
(besides by equities) by investing in conventional assets, and when consumption is
financed by annuities. e(s, x) is the amount of money invested in risky assets at
age s, of an x year old consumer.2 R(s)
R(x) is the financial present value at age x, of a
monetary unit received at age s, and R(s)
R(x)
Ω(s)
















It is worth noting that neither (3.2) nor (3.3) constrain wealth to be nonnega-
tive along the lifespan. Nevertheless, the economic agent never dies in debt under
(3.3), but she could under (3.2). This is an important property that we shall use
subsequently. Also, if the consumer decides to purchase annuities, she will not leave
a bequest. But, in contrast, if she chooses to finance consumption by investing in
bonds, she will unintentionally bequeath at death. Therefore, choosing either (3.2) or
2Hereinafter, whenever the consumer will decide to purchase annuities, both mean consumption
and money invested in risky assets will be denoted with a hat.
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(3.3) has important consequences on income distribution inter and intra-generations.
However, this fact is beyond the scope of this chapter.
So far we have established the general framework from which an individual accu-
mulates assets to finance her future consumption. Now, we shall proceed by explain-
ing the solutions obtained by plugging a CRRA utility function (u(ξ) = ξ
1−γ
1−γ , γ > 0)
into (3.26), and assuming that consumption variance at age s is proportional to risky
investment variance at age s, of an x year old consumer. That is,
σ2c (s, x) = η
2σ2α(s)e
2(s, x), for all s, x ∈ [0, T ) with s > x, (3.4)
where η > 0 is the constant of proportionality and σ2α is the equity variance.
The agent maximizes (3.26) subject to either (3.2) or (3.3). Solving this economic
problem yields two different consumption trajectories, which are quite similar to the
uncertain lifetime case with just bonds and annuities.3 Nevertheless, equities now
modify the marginal utility of consumption and, consequently, the dynamic of con-
sumption is also moved according to the expected evolution of asset returns. For
example, consumption increases (resp. decreases) whenever the difference between
asset returns also increases (resp. decreases). These consumption changes, nonethe-
less, are not high enough to produce consumption trajectories totally different from
those obtained by Sanchez-Romero (2005). This circumstance is explained by the






















Where both ϕ and ϕˆ are functions whose range are restricted to the closed interval
[1, 2]. The first two components on the right side of the equality signal are similar
to Merton (1971) and Richard (1975). However, the amount of money invested in
risky assets depends on consumption, instead of depending on initial wealth and the
3The reader will find the analytical solutions in the Appendix. In order to compare these results
with those obtained in Merton (1971) an additional Appendix has been included.
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present value of future non-capital earnings. As a consequence, this model yields
portfolios which are mainly composed of either bonds or annuities.4 In particular,
the proportion of either bonds or annuities relative to equities raises as our individual
ages. Thus, equities are the main investment when the economic agent is young,
but as time goes by she prefers to hold safer investments.
On the other hand, so long as Social Security does not pay benefits, wealth is
also held in annuities rather than in bonds. Both the bounded rationality and the
liquidity constraint assumptions are key factors for this allocation process. Thus,
unless individuals purchase annuities or they have sufficient capital, they are unable
to anticipate consumption at the beginning of their life cycle. Therefore, we find that
young individuals are more willing to purchase annuities in order to increase their
consumption. However, the presence of annuities raises borrowed money and so,
because individuals must repay their debts, the economic agents have a lower positive
asset position upon retirement. This latter fact negatively affects the demand for
annuities, Sanchez-Romero (2005). Nonetheless, they will buy insurances contingent
on their death due to the lack of public benefits assumed so far.
In sum, in an economy without Social Security, we find that our agent allocates
her wealth in a portfolio composed by equities and annuities. But, equities repre-
sent a small percentage of total wealth, and annuities decrease wealth held upon
retirement among those individuals who have needed to borrow money at young
ages.















where ε is a real number which satisfies that σc
c
≤ ε < 1. In particular, Tsiang (1972) suggests
a value of 1
10
for ǫ, therefore we cannot expect high values of ϕ(x,x)
η2
. Note that this condition
corresponds to the non-annuitized wealth case. Thus, if we are interested in the value of ηˆ, we
should add the mortality risk premium to r(x).
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3.3 Payroll Tax and Wealth-Age Profiles
Up to now, we have studied the asset accumulation process of an individual who
lives in an economy without Social Security. Under this scenario, we have found that
individuals mainly purchase annuities because it enables one to borrow money, and
because it assures an income after retirement. In this section however we introduce
an actuarially fair funded social security system that assures an income at retirement.
Thus, Social Security levies a payroll tax τ on gross earnings, in exchange of a future





(1− τe)w(s) 0 ≤ s < J
b(s) s ≥ J
, (3.5)
where w(s) is the gross salary at age s, b(s) = b, for all s, is the flat public pension
benefit received at retirement, and J is the age of retirement. We consider that
the payroll tax is paid not only by the employee τe, but also by the employer τf .
As a consequence, our representative individual receives an actuarially fair pension
benefit equal to:






This assumption is introduced into the model because current social security
regimes are jointly financed by employers and employees. In addition, the fact
that Social Security is financed by these two agents has important and interesting
consequences on individual saving. For example, a funded social security system
financed by employers and employees generates an increase in lifetime resources.
The positive income effect caused by the system, however, differs according to the
portfolio chosen by each individual. Thus, in a model without firms, Hubbard (1987)
proves that an actuarially fair and funded system generates an increase in lifetime
resources when individuals do not purchase actuarially fair annuities. Nevertheless, a
system partially financed by employers generates an increase in lifetime resources as
well, even when individuals purchase annuities. That is to say, substituting equation
(3.5) and (3.6) into the budget constraint (3.3), and afterwards subtracting (3.3) with
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This increment in resources correspond to those individuals who purchase actuarially
fair annuities. (3.7) equals the pension financed by the employer; since we are
assuming that w(s) is the maximum gross salary, that the employer is willing to
pay without Social Security. On the contrary, if our individual decides to finance
her consumption with the portfolio composed by bonds, we will expect a greater
increment in lifetime resources than if it is financed by annuities.5 Repeating the

























We have found according to (3.7) and (3.8) that an actuarially fair funded Social
Security could raise lifetime resources. On the one hand, we know that the higher the
income effect is, the greater the payroll tax is. On the other hand, the income effect
also increases when our individual decides to invest in bonds, instead of doing so in
annuities. Consequently, given a periodical earning such as (3.5), we can enumerate
three causes that reduce private saving: i) a decrease in net salary, ii) an increase in
consumption due to the positive income effect, and iii) a lower necessity of saving
for retirement motive. Nevertheless, the decrease in private savings is offset by an
increase in public savings. Therefore, it is not clear that the individual wealth6 will
be reduced in the long run. In fact, individual wealth may either increase or decrease
depending on how the payroll tax modifies both public and private wealth over time.
In particular, we expect that Social Security will raise (resp. reduce) individual
wealth accumulated, so long as the elasticity of public savings with respect to the
5Given that κ also depends on Ω, we expect that Ω(s) > 1
κ
for almost all ages (s) between x
and J years old.
6Hereinafter we call “individual wealth” as the sum of private and public wealth.
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payroll tax is greater (resp. lower) than the absolute value of the elasticity of private
savings with respect to the payroll tax.
In order to understand how individual wealth evolves over time, we simulate nine
wealth profiles which differ according to the payroll tax and the proportion of the
tax levied by each economic agent. To do so, we assume that bonds yield an annual
constant interest rate r equal to 0.037. Equities yield an interest rate that follows
an Ito process
α(s)ds = r(s)ds+ σαdB(s), dB(s) ∼ N(0,
√
ds)
where σα equals 0.1. The individual satisfies every feature explained in section 3.2,
with a γ-value of 2, and a time discount factor δ of 0.02. Moreover, we assume that
the gross earning received by the individual, which is used to calculate these wealth
profiles, is depicted by Figure 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1: Gross Earning Profile (w(s))












The actuarially fair funded Social Security offers an implied rate of return equal
to the mortality hazard rate plus bonds return. Table 3.1 shows the annual pension
benefits that our individual will receive for different payroll taxes (i.e. τ = τe + τf ).
On the one hand, it shows that a total payroll tax of 3 percent roughly assure a
benefit equal to the lowest income of her life. On the other hand, values of 6 and 8
percent points approximately guarantee 85 percent of her average earning and her
highest earning, respectively. We have chosen these percentages because they are
the most important three cases, which will be explained subsequently. In addition,
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a percentage greater than 8 percent makes no sense because it has perverse effects
both on private saving and on the economy.
Table 3.1: Benefits (b)




Note: The individual retires at the age of 65. The
mortality hazard rate is assumed to follow the Gom-
pertz’s Law µ(s) = αeβs, where α is equal to
9, 221765 · 10−5 and β = 0, 085277.
Given this setup, Figure 3.2 shows that our individual borrows money at the
beginning of her life-cycle in order to anticipate her consumption. However, the
money borrowed decreases as the payroll tax increases (dotted square line). Note in
Figure 3.2 that changing the total payroll tax τ from 3 to 6 raises individual wealth.
By contrast, Figure 3.3 shows that a payroll tax of 8 percent leads our individual to
not save for retirement (dotted line with an x mark); as a consequence total wealth
is almost the same as an economy without Social Security (solid line).
We have found that the increment of total wealth occurs because young indi-
viduals are not willing to purchase annuities. However, if our individual does not
purchase annuities along her lifespan, as happens in Figure 3.3, there will not be
such an increment. Hence, there must exist a payroll tax that maximizes individual
wealth without strangling private savings. In this particular case the optimal payroll
tax is equal to 6, as Table 3.2 shows.
Table 3.2: Individual Wealth at the age of 65
τe (τf = 0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Percentage 100 100 100 100 100 105 117 89 102
Note: 100 = 247.519, 26 euros.
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Figure 3.2: Wealth Profiles: Payroll Taxes 3 and 6 Percents
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Employee 1% vs. Employer 5%
Age
Wealth without Social Security
Individual Private Wealth
Individual Public Wealth
Sum of Public and Private Individual Wealth
This fact implies that even though a social security system leads young individ-
uals to be worse off in terms of consumption, their wealth become greater as they
age (if, and only if, the system has not excessively levied gross earnings). Thus,
the system does not necessarily offset one public monetary unit by another private
one. In fact, a different payroll tax can help to raise individual wealth.7 Another
alternative for raising individual wealth is to increase τf and decrease τe. However,
we have not found significant changes to wealth, as Figure 3.2 shows, that could
balance the negative effect on unemployment caused by the increment on the labor
cost versus the capital cost.
7Note that Table 3.2 is calculated under the assumption that τf equals 0.
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Figure 3.3: Wealth Profile: Payroll Tax 8 Percent




















Note: in this case, there is no difference between the proportion of the tax paid by each agent.
In sum, an actuarially fair funded Social Security expels the demand for private
annuities, but it may increase individual wealth as well. The former effect has been
widely discussed since Feldstein (1974). By contrast, the latter effect results if, and
only if, the following two circumstances take place: i) individuals voluntarily decide
not to purchase annuities and ii) financial markets do not allow individuals to die
in debt. Therefore, this result shows, contrary to previous research, that a social
security system can contribute to reaching a higher national wealth, even when the
economy is made up of selfish individuals.
3.4 Effects of a Fully Funded Social Security on the De-
mand for Private Annuities
It has been pointed out that an actuarially fair and fully funded social security
system does not reduce the steady-state wealth whenever individuals are selfish
and a private annuity market exists. In order to obtain this result, it is necessary
to assume that individuals are rational. Otherwise, if individuals have a bounded
rationality of the sort explained in this chapter, the actuarially fair and fully funded
Social Security can either increase or decrease steady-state wealth (see Table 3.2).
Since the introduction of the system reduces the desire of purchasing annuities and,
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as a consequence, individuals can either have a greater individual wealth because
they do not borrow money at young ages, or have a lower individual wealth because
they do not save for retirement. Therefore, we analyze in this section the possible
reasons for not investing in private annuities and how it affects individual wealth.
The introduction of this social security system yields two reasons for not in-
vesting in annuities. First, it causes a lower private wealth upon retirement8 that
reduces the desire of purchasing annuities. As it is explained by Sanchez-Romero
(2005). Second, following Hubbard (1987), individuals may prefer bonds to annu-
ities in order to achieve higher lifetime resources, see (3.8). Thereby, the higher the
contribution to Social Security is, the greater the crowding out effect on the demand
for private annuities is. However, the first reason is offset because we have assumed
that financial institutions do not allow individuals to die in debt. Thus, Social Se-
curity may increase private wealth by inducing individuals to hold their wealth in
the form of bonds; since once they purchase bonds instead of annuities, they are
unable to borrow money and so they have a greater positive asset position earlier.9
The intensity of these two opposite effects on private wealth is the key factor to
determine whether or not the system produces a crowding out. In particular, we
find that Social Security raises wealth while it does not cancel private saving for
retirement.
This current section proceeds as follows. First, we explain the demand for private
annuities when there is no Social Security. We use its annuity equivalent wealth
values (AEW) as our baseline case. Subsequently, we divide this section in two
subsections in order to give insight into how Social Security changes the demand
for private annuities. One subsection shows an individual’s behavior when private
markets offer fair annuities, and the other subsection shows the individual’s behavior
when they offer unfair annuities. Both subsections contain tables and figures which
depict the desire to purchase annuities for different payroll taxes and risk aversion
8This is equivalent to say that Social Security reduces private saving for retirement.




We found in section 3.3 that young people prefer annuities to bonds in order to
anticipate consumption. This is because financial institutions do not lend money
unless people insure their wealth with life insurances. Later on, assuming an econ-
omy without public pensions, individuals prefer to purchase annuities in order to
maintain their economic status. If they choose, by contrast, the alternative portfo-
lio composed of bonds, then they have the risk of outliving their financial resources
more quickly. Equivalently, in the case of holding their wealth in bonds, individuals
may not have an income in the time just before death. Therefore, people always
prefer to purchase annuities when there is no Social Security. Figure 3.4 below shows
this statement for the representative agent introduced in the previous section. Note
that AEW values10 are higher than one, and thus annuities are preferred over bonds.
AEW has a Λ-shape which means that this individual is more willing to purchase
annuities as she approaches the date of retirement; while she is almost indifferent
when choosing between bonds and annuities both at the beginning of her life-cycle
and at the end.
Figure 3.4: A.E.W. by Age Without Social Security











Note: An annuity equivalent wealth value lower (resp. greater)than one means that the individual
prefers (resp. does not prefer) bonds to annuities.
10The proportion of annuitized wealth that is necessary to achieve the utility level when the
consumer has no access to the annuity market.
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The introduction of Social Security will move the AEW figure downwards. Thus,
given that AEW has a Λ-shape, we have to expect that the system mainly affects
our individual when young, conditioning her future decisions afterwards. In addition
to age, Figure 3.4 also changes according to the behavior towards risk and the
proportion of the load charged upon annuities.
3.4.1 Perfect Life Insurance
Private annuity markets, which offer actuarially fair life insurances, assure that
individuals’ lifetime resources raise according to either (3.7) or (3.8). Consequently,
every result already obtained is applicable. Here, we focus on studying how private
wealth is modified by different payroll taxes and risk aversion coefficients. This is
because, following Sanchez-Romero (2005), the demand for private annuities mainly
depends on private wealth and on future benefits. In order to analyze this fact, we
will first pay attention to our agent at the age of 65, see Table 3.3 below. Second,
we shall study with the help of Figure 3.5 the demand for private annuities in a
dynamic perspective.
Table 3.3: Private Wealth at the age of 65
Payroll Tax Risk Aversion Coefficient
τe vs. τf γ = 0.75 γ = 2 γ = 5
3-0 292.550,10a 153.032,06a 114.137,23a
1,5-1,5 298.355,56a 156.744,85a 117.266,63a
0,5-2,5 302.225,87a 159.220,04a 119.352,89a
6-0 213.502,81a 100.001,84a 55.353,57a
3-3 222.280,32a 103.725,10a 58.056,57a
1-5 227.218,18a 106.177,29a 59.878,10a
8-0 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
4-4 0,00b 0,00b 45.476,75a
1,33-6,67 0,00b 0,00b 49.068,69a
a The individual decides to annuitize her private wealth.
b The individual prefers to hold her private wealth in bonds.
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Table 3.3 above shows whether our individual purchases annuities (superscript a) or
not (superscript b) according to her private wealth and her risk aversion coefficient.
Thus, the table contains three important features: i) given the gross earning profile
of Figure 3.1 and using Table 3.1, we find that our individual purchases annuities
so long as the payroll tax is lower than 8 percent. This is an important result not
only because she achieves, according to Table 3.2, a greater wealth, but also because
it assures a periodical income up to her death. ii) it is worth noting that in this
model the risk aversion coefficient causes two opposite effects upon the demand for
private annuities. On the one hand, it is well known that the higher the risk aversion
coefficient is, the greater the desire of an agent to purchase annuities is. However,
on the other hand, we see in Table 3.3 that the lower the γ value is, the greater
the private wealth at the age of retirement is. Thus, the agent is more willing to
purchase annuities. In sum, once again the risk aversion coefficient does not explain
the demand for annuities. Finally, iii) private wealth increases as the proportion of
the payroll tax paid by the employer increases. This wealth increment nonetheless
is not high enough to balance the resources paid by the employer11 except for the
case in which both the individual is quite risk adverse and the payroll tax is greater
or equal than 8 percent.
In addition to the static analysis presented in Table 3.3, Figure 3.5 above shows
the AEW values by age associated with the following payroll taxes: (3-0), (6-0)
and (8-0). The solid line plots how our individual always prefers annuities to bonds
with a payroll tax of 3 percent. A payroll tax of 6 percent (dotted line) causes our
individual to decide to purchase bonds instead of annuities at the beginning of her
life-cycle. The dashed line plots how she always purchases bonds with a payroll tax
of 8 percent. Therefore, AEW values by age are pushed downwards as the payroll
tax increases (in order to see how AEW by age evolves, compare Figure 3.5 with
Figure 3.4). However, once the individual has decided to purchase bonds along the
rest of her life, the AEW by age has an inverted Λ-shape. As a consequence, we
11According to equation (3.6) the amount of the benefit received only depends on the total payroll
tax, i.e. τe + τf .
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Figure 3.5: A.E.W. by Age With Social Security and Fair Annuities













do not expect that she will reject her investment once she has decided the asset in
which she allocates her wealth. In fact, as seen in Figure 3.5, financial institutions
will have to offer greater returns in order to be able to make people change from one
asset to another.12
3.4.2 Imperfect Life Insurance
In the real world we do not find actuarially fair annuities. In general, annuities
are loaded by insurers with the intention of financing reserves, administrative costs,
commissions, and profits. Therefore, it is more realistic to analyze previous results
when life insurances do not offer fair annuities. The first consequence of this fact
is that an actuarially fair funded Social Security offers a higher rate of return than
private annuities, and hence individuals achieve a greater wealth by investing in
public pensions than in private annuities. Second, an imperfect annuity market
cannot offset those annuities offered by the social security system. This situation
causes both an income effect and a substitution effect that change the demand for
private annuities when fair life insurances were offered. Specifically, a lower annuity
12Thus, if policy makers aim to annuitize private pension plans, then it is convenient to undertake
policies when people are between 30 and 50 years old.
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return increases present consumption and diminishes future consumption due to the
substitution effect. Thus, our individual either consumes all her income if she invests
in bonds, or borrows more money at the beginning of her life-cycle, and subsequently
increases her saving, in the case of investing in annuities. On the other hand, given
that public benefits are actuarially fair, an imperfect private annuity market reduces
the income effect produced by investing in bonds. In order to show this fact, we
assume for the sake of simplicity that annuities yield the following rate of return at
age s:13
r(s) + (1−̟)µ(s), for all s ∈ [x, T ),
where ̟ ∈ (0, 1) is the percentage of load over the mortality hazard rate. Note that
we use this formula in order to satisfy that the yield of annuities still dominates that
of bonds. Thereby, (3.7) converges to (3.8) as we give to ̟ a value close to 1. Thus

























From (3.9) we derive, whenever insurers offer unfair annuities, that the positive
income effect caused by switching from annuities to bonds is diminished. According
to this effect, annuities are now more preferred than bonds. However, the latter
cannot balance the substitution effect. Indeed, we can see comparing Tables 3.3 and
3.4 below, that bonds are now more preferred than annuities at the age of 65.
13Now, Ω has been transformed to Ωˆ which has the following formula:
Ωˆ(x) = e−(1−̟)
∫ x
0 µ(j)dj > Ω(x), for all x ∈ [0, T ).
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Table 3.4: Private Wealth under Unfair Annuities at the
age of 65
Payroll Tax Load Risk Aversion Coefficient
τe ̟ γ = 0.75 γ = 2 γ = 5
0,25 245.527,90a 148.750,39a 119.05753a
3 0,50 199.331,52a 142.438,29a 124.514,48a
0,75 141.062,91b 131.942,28a 130.045,47a
0,25 0,00b 100.890,77a 57.383,95a
6 0,50 0,00b 33.473,84b 60.787,67a
0,75 0,00b 33.473,84b 66.450,95a
0,25 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
8 0,50 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
0,75 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
a The individual decides to annuitize her private wealth.
b The individual prefers to hold her private wealth in bonds.
We realize in Table 3.4 that private wealth decreases more markedly as the risk
aversion lowers (see columns with γ = 2 and γ = 0, 75) and the load increases.
Instead, a γ value equal to 5 yields a higher private wealth under unfair annuities
than under fair ones. This is so because she prefers bonds to annuities at the
beginning of her life-cycle and, as a consequence, she cannot borrow money because
she simply consumes her income during this period. Moreover, we have used three
different loads {0,25; 0,5; 0,75} with the aim of showing how the demand for private
annuities mainly depends on the relationship between private wealth and the present
value of future earnings. Thus, it is worth noting that any of these loads yield, by
definition, an annuity internal rate of return greater than that of bonds (r = 0, 037);
in particular, at the age of 65 they are equal to {0,049; 0,046; 0,042} respectively.
Therefore, the more unfair annuities are, the greater the present value of future
benefits with respect to current private wealth is. Thus, the individual is less willing
to purchase annuities.14 In addition to the relationship between private wealth
and future earnings, the risk aversion coefficient γ has to be considered as well,
14Read proposition 2.1 in Chapter 2.
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given that it determines the threshold private wealth from which our individual
switches her investments from annuities to bonds. For example, Table 3.4 shows
that, when annuities are not fair, an individual with both a γ equal to 0, 75 and an
annual pension benefit of 17.455 euros15 decides not to invest either in bonds, nor in
annuities, for retirement. By contrast, in the subsection 3.4.1, Table 3.3 shows that
under the same features our individual accumulates 213.502, 81 euros by investing in
fair annuities. Thus, we can note that the threshold private wealth is easily reached,
so long as the risk aversion decreases and the load increases.
Table 3.5: Individual Wealth at the age of 65 under
Unfair Annuities (γ = 2)
τe (τf = 0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
̟ = 0, 25 102 101 99 98 97 106 117 89 102
̟ = 0, 50 104 101 99 96 95 107 90 89 102
̟ = 0, 75 107 102 97 91 97 94 90 89 102
We have used as benchmark 100 = 247.519, 26 euros, which corresponds to
the individual wealth achieved under fair annuities and no Social Security
(see Table 3.2). Note that individual wealth is greater than our benchmark
case for payroll taxes 1, 5 and 6. Nonetheless, the difference is reduced, and
is even negative, as the load approaches to one.
In sum, assuming an actuarially fair funded Social Security, individual wealth
at the age of retirement is negatively affected by an unfair annuity market. This is
so, unless policy makers decide to either reduce the payroll tax below 3 percent, or
increase it up to 8 percent (see Table 3.5). However, if we take the first decision,
we expect that people will outlive their financial resources faster and, consequently,
their consumption will decrease as time goes by. Therefore, looking at consumption
trajectories depicted in Figure 3.6 below, we recommend levying a payroll tax of 8
percent, not only because it assures an income after retirement, but also because
individual wealth is not depleted before death.
15See Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.6: Consumption, Individual Wealth and A.E.W. by Age, With
Social Security and Unfair Private Annuities (̟=0,50; γ = 2)


































Note: annuities are only purchased when the payroll tax
is lower than 3 percent.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents new results about the crowding out effect produced by an
actuarially fair funded Social Security on the stock of capital. We find that our
consumer is more willing to purchase bonds, instead of annuities, as the payroll
tax levied increases. On the one side, Social Security diminishes private wealth
upon retirement which reduces the desire of purchasing annuities. On the other
side, our individual may prefer bonds to annuities in order to achieve higher lifetime
resources. We also find that, although this social security system expels the demand
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for private annuities, it may increase individual wealth. This latter fact nonetheless
only happens so long as our individual voluntarily decides not to purchase annuities
at the beginning of her life-cycle and, furthermore, that financial markets do not
allow individuals to die in debt.
These findings show, contrary to previous research, that a social security system
can contribute to reach a higher national wealth, even when the economy is com-
posed by selfish individuals. For example, some simulation exercises presented here
point out that a payroll tax of 6 percent increases individual wealth up to 17 per-
cent points. This increment however is obtained under the assumption that private
insurers offer fair annuities. Thus, on the contrary, under an unfair private annuity
market, individual wealth can decrease around a 10 percent for the same payroll
tax.
The importance of these findings raise some questions for future research. The
most important is to determine the optimal payroll tax under an unfunded Social
Security. Since, given the increasingly concern in developed countries about the
feasibility of the social security system, a similar finding, as the one presented here,
could contribute not only to decrease the payroll tax for future generations of work-
ers, but also to give new reasons for maintaining the current social security system.
3.6 Appendix
Our agent decides each time whether to annuitize her wealth or not. This circum-
stance lies on the assumption (v) (bounded rationality) introduced in this model.
As a consequence, our individual compares the utility reported by annuitizing her
wealth with not doing so. Thus, we maximize her expected utility twice regarding
either equation (3.2) or equation (3.3). But, because the algebra in both processes
are similar, we shall only derive the optimal consumption and investment at age x,
when our individual decides not to annuitize her wealth.
Optimal Consumption and Investment at age x under a Non-annuitized
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Wealth.
Assuming that our agent at age x maximizes equation (3.26), subject to (3.2)
and (3.4) then, we can compute the optimal allocation process as an isoperimetric
problem, whose equation is



















R(x) (θ(s)σα(s)e(s, x) + y(s)− c(s, x)) ds
)
where θ(s) = α(s)−r(s)
σα(s)
.





2e2(x, x)c(x, x)−2−γ − λ(x) = 0, (3.10)






(θ(s)σα(s)e(s, x) + y(s)− c(s, x)) ds = 0. (3.12)
Now, we should follow the next six steps in order to derive c(x, x) and e(x, x). Firstly,
we derive the function e(x, x) from (3.11). Second, we plug e(x, x) into (3.10) and








c(s, x)γ ,∀s ∈ [x, T ) (3.13)
and introduce it into the last equation. Thus, by solving the second-order equation















)2 for all x ∈ [0, T ).




























for all s ∈ [x, T ). Fifth, by plugging
























Sixth and last, we introduce (3.16) into (3.14). So, the rate of expenditure on
consumption and the amount of money invested in risky assets at age x are equal to





























Nonetheless, we still need to prove that (3.17) and (3.18) are maximums as well
as (3.26) converges to a mean-variance utility function. Thus, ℑ satisfies the set of




where if e(s, x) > 0 (resp. < 0) then ℑce = ℑec > 0 (resp. < 0). And finally,
following Tsiang (1972), we apply the following two constraints in order that a
CRRA utility function converges to our mean-variance utility function:
1. σc(s,x)







≥ 0,∀s ∈ [x, T ).
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3.7 Appendix 2
It can be argued that the investment function presented here is more restrictive
than the investment function from Merton (1971). In this Appendix, we will briefly
demonstrate that the investment function introduced by Merton is also subject to
similar constraints. Thus, it is first necessary to solve Merton’s model with lifetime
uncertainty.
3.7.1 The Merton’s Model
In order to solve the optimal consumption and portfolio problem we are going to
follow five steps. First, we will introduce the functional with life uncertainty. Sec-
ond, we will present the budget constraint that our representative individual faces.
Third, by using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman method we will derive the optimiza-
tion problem. In the fourth step, we will calculate the first optimal conditions and
we will assume both a utility function and a functional which satisfy the necessary
convergency conditions. Finally, in the fifth step, we will complete the proof by
deriving the function a(t), which will be introduced subsequently.
The Expected Utility Equation
The expected utility equation, or functional J , with lifetime uncertainty is:16














Applying the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approximation to our functional,





















(U(c(s), s) + (µ(s) + δ)B(W (s), s))ds
)
,
J(W (t), t) = max{c,w} Et(U(c(t), t)dt+ (µ(t) + δ)B(W (t), t)dt
+(1− (µ(t) + δ)dt)J(W (t) + dW (t), t+ dt)).
16F (t) = Ω(t)β(t).
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Thus, the functional J(W (t) + dW (t), t+ dt) can be approximated as follows17





The individual faces the following budget constraint:
dW (t) = (y(t)−c(t))dt+w(t)W (t)((α(t)−r(t))dt+σ(t)dq(t))+r(t)W (t)dt, (3.20)
where its mean and variance operators are:
Et(dW (t)) = (y(t)− c(t))dt+ (w(t)(α(t)− r(t)) + r(t))W (t)dt, (3.21)
Et(dW (t))
2 = σ2(t)w2(t)W 2(t)dt. (3.22)
The Optimization Problem










0 = max{c,w}(U(c(t), t) + (µ(t) + δ)(B(W (t), t)− J) + Jt
+JW ((y(t)− c(t)) + (w(t)(α(t)− r(t)) + r(t))W (t)) + 12JWW (σ2(t)w2(t)W 2(t)).
Now Let us assume that our individual is a selfish consumer. Thus, the individual
does not leave a bequest, B(W (t), t) = 0,∀t ∈ (0, T ). As a consequence, the equation
is as follows
0 = max{c,w}(U(c(t), t)− (µ(t) + δ)J + Jt + JW ((y(t)− c(t))
+(w(t)(α(t)− r(t)) + r(t))W (t))
+12JWW (σ
2(t)w2(t)W 2(t)).
17Hereinafter, for the sake of simplicity, we denote J(W (t), t) as J .
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First Optimal Conditions
The following equations give us the first optimal conditions:
Uc(c(t), t)− JW = 0, (3.24)
JW (α(t)− r(t)) + w(t)JWWσ2(t)W (t) = 0. (3.25)




and the functional is
J(W (t), t) = a(t)
(W (t) + b(t))1−γ







r(τ)dτds. Then, by plugging (3.26) and (3.27) into both
(3.24) and (3.25), the optimal consumption and investment in risky asset are respec-
tively:










(W (t) + b(t)). (3.29)
Function a(t)
Thus far, we have obtained the solution to the equation, however in order to complete
the demonstration, we need to derive the function a(t). Thus,
0 = Ja(t)
− 1
γ − (µ(t) + δ)J + Jt + JW (y(t)− c(t) + (w(t)(α(t)− r(t)) + r(t))W (t))
+12JWWσ
2(t)w2(t)W 2(t) ⇒
⇒ 0 = Ja(t)− 1γ − (µ(t) + δ)J + J( a˙(t)
a(t) + (1− γ) W˙ (t)+b˙(t)W (t)+b(t)) + 1−γW (t)+b(t)J(y(t)− c(t) +
(w(t)(α(t)− r(t)) + r(t))W (t))− 12 γ(1−γ)(W (t)+b(t))2Jσ2(t)w2(t)W 2(t).
Dividing this equation by the common factor J , it gives that
0 = a(t)
− 1
γ − µ(t)− δ + a˙(t)
a(t) + (1− γ) W˙ (t)+b˙(t)W (t)+b(t) + 1−γW (t)+b(t)(y(t)− c(t) + (w(t)(α(t)−
r(t)) + r(t))W (t))− 12 γ(1−γ)(W (t)+b(t))2σ2(t)w2(t)W 2(t).
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Subsequently, by using equations (3.28) and (3.29), we get that
0 = a(t)
− 1
γ − µ(t)− δ + a˙(t)






θ2(t)(W (t) + b(t)) + r(t)W (t))− 12 (1−γ)γ θ2(t),
where θ(t) = α(t)−r(t)
σ(t) . Now, we proceed to simplify
0 = γa(t)
− 1
γ − µ(t)− δ + a˙(t)
a(t) +
(1−γ)
W (t)+b(t)(W˙ (t) + b˙(t)) +
1−γ
W (t)+b(t)(y(t) +




From (3.21), if W˙ (t) is equal to y(t)− c(t)+w(t)W (t)θ(t)σ(t)+ r(t)W (t) and b˙(t) =
−y(t) + r(t)b(t), the equation will give
0 =
(2γ−1)a(t)− 1γ −µ(t)−δ+ a˙(t)
a(t) +(1−γ)r(t)+ 1−γW (t)+b(t)(y(t)+r(t)W (t))+ 32 (1−γ)γ θ2(t).
Now, let us assume that:
k(t) = −µ(t)−δ+(1−γ)r(t)+ 1− γ








0 = (2γ − 1)a(t)− 1γ + a˙(t)
a(t)
+ k(t).
Multiplying the latter equation by a(t), then a˙(t) results
a˙(t) = (1− 2γ)a(t)1− 1γ − k(t)a(t). (3.31)













((1− 2γ)a(t)1− 1γ − k(t)a(t)) ⇒
z˙(t) = (1− 2γ)− k(t)z(t).































k(s)ds = (1− 2γ) ⇒



























z(t) = C(T )e
∫ T
t

















3.7.2 Analysis of solutions
The optimal consumption and investment in risky assets have the following mapping:
c∗(t) =


















(W (t) + b(t)) (3.34)
Now, we are going to calculate the marginal propensity to consume as a function of
time. Firstly, in order to know how z(t) evolves, we only need to obtain the first




W (0) + b(0)
e
∫ T





c∗(t) = W (T ) + b(T ),∀k(s). (3.36)
For the sake of simplicity, we will consider the case when k(s) = k,∀s. Therefore










By assuming that T →∞, k should be a negative scalar in order to have an economic
meaning; otherwise, the marginal propensity to consume will be zero. Hence, the
following constraints apply:
a) γ > 12 .
b) k > 1− 2γ.




if 12 < γ < 1 θ
2 > 2γ3
(
1− r − y+rW
W+b − γ−µ−δ1−γ
)
if γ > 1 θ2 < 2γ3
(
1− r − y+rW
W+b − γ−µ−δ1−γ
)
In addition to the latter constraints, it is necessary to pay attention to the saving
path. To do so, we need to demonstrate that the hump saving pattern applies.
Hence, from (3.21) we know that
W˙ (t) + b˙(t)










= r − k
1− 2γ .
Therefore, if we are looking for a hump saving pattern, it is needed that W˙ (t)
W (t) > 0
for t ∈ [0, T¯ ), where T¯ corresponds at least to half of the total life span.
d) µ+ δ < r.
In sum, following Merton (1971) we need to satisfy these four conditions in order




In Chapter 2 we analyzed the desire to purchase annuities at the age of retirement,
J = 65. We considered two initial wealths (150.000 and 300.000) and a flat pension
benefit, paid by an unfunded social security, which depends on the demographic
structure as well as on the factor prices under stationary conditions.
Here we extend the analysis to the life cycle, instead of simply the retirement
period. We thus determine how both consumption and wealth evolve along the life
cycle. Nonetheless, note that current wealth profiles can be split into private and
public wealths. Thus, in order to compare the current results with those obtained in
Chapter 2, we need to take into account that these wealth paths include both public
and private data. On the other hand, because we have already proven that the
survival probability does not completely explain the demand for private annuities
at a given age, we have only simulated two Spanish cohorts and have also focused
our simulations on the male case. For the sake of reality, we have estimated a non-
flat gross earning profile following a Mincerian equation, since we are limited to the
average salary of the economy from Chapter 4. Finally, it is worth noting that in
the current chapter the social security system is funded.
These simulations proceed as follows: first, we compare the allocation process
for different survival probabilities {1960 and 2000}. Second, we change with respect
to previous simulations the age of retirement from 65, from previous simulations,
to 70. Third, we study the allocation process under different factor prices. We will
choose each alternative according to Table 3.6 below.
We have found that the greater the life expectancy of the individual, the greater
the need to accumulate assets for retirement and thus, the greater the likelihood
that she will purchase annuities. In the same way, the greater the life expectancy is,
the lower the effect of a funded social security on the demand for annuities becomes.
Thus, in this particular case, a payroll tax of 3 percent does not affect on the demand
for annuities when the individual belongs to the cohort were born in 2000. Thus,
even though we claimed in Chapter 2 that the survival probability does not affect
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the demand for annuities at a certain age, it is not absolutely true in a life-cycle
context. We can expect therefore that an economy populated by individuals with a
greater life expectancy will not only save more, but will also the population purchase
more annuities.
We have also found that the delaying of the age of retirement has a negative
impact on the demand for private annuities. The motive for this is twofold. First of
all, the number of years of contribution to the funded social security raises and as a
consequence the pension benefit increases. Seconds, the life expectancy at retirement
decreases, and so the pension benefit increases as well. Hence, the individual is less
willing to insure her wealth as higher the age of retirement. Thus, the impact of
this policy cannot be well studied under a partial equilibrium model, since it gives
ambiguous results due to the negative impact on the demand for annuities, e.g.
Tables 3.7 and 3.9.
The risk aversion, similar to the survival probability, is able to modify the de-
cision of purchasing an asset contingent on her mortality risk, but only throughout
a life-cycle framework. At the beginning of the life cycle, the consumption of our
individual is greater under the condition that γ = 2 than γ = .75. However, the
former yields a greater saving afterwards. Consequently, it is likely that as greater
the risk aversion becomes, the individual is more willing to purchase annuities.
Table 3.6: Stationary Wage Profiles According to both the
Age of Retirement and the Cohort
Retirement Age 65
Risk Aversion Coefficient γ Cohort 1960 β1 2000 β1
.75 .0150 19.180 0.10785 19.180 0.10779
.0213 18.474 0.10494 18.474 0.10490
2 .0150 19.180 0.10785 19.180 0.10779
.0400 17.179 0.09927 17.179 0.09928
Retirement Age 70
Risk Aversion Coefficient γ Cohort 1960 β1 2000 β1
.75 .0150 19.180 0.10414 19.180 0.10334
.0213 18.474 0.10120 18.474 0.10042
2 .0150 19.180 0.10414 19.180 0.10334
.0400 17.179 0.09549 17.179 0.09474
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Figure 3.7: Gross Salary Profiles













































We have used the following Mincerian equation with the β1 obtained from Table
3.6:




,∀s ∈ [20, 70].
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Table 3.7: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = .75,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -129.0910 -38.008 10.809 14.412 -152.257 5.405 10.809 14.412
40 -112.591 -34.112 35.391 47.188 -158.617 17.695 35.391 47.188
50 66.842 130.921 77.944 103.926 941 49.338 77.944 103.926
60 324.912 373.805 142.902 190.537 238.764 141.999 142.902 190.537
70 377.312 411.641 154.195 205.593 254.623 77.060 154.195 205.593
80 242.730 264.678 94.286 125.715 99.566 47.100 94.286 125.715
90 143.126 25.323 52.323 52.506 70.009 19.735 26.203 52.506
100 78.941 12.413 26.985 35.980 974 13.434 26.985 35.980
Figure 3.8: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 65,
γ = .75, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.8: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = .75,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -111.354 -111.342 10.762 14.349 -123.621 -39.987 10.762 14.349
40 -70.976 -70.955 51.759 46.514 -96.524 -28.093 34.886 46.514
50 137.066 137.092 240.381 112.560 97.789 147.691 117.733 112.560
60 416.240 416.261 497.491 219.580 359.433 388.715 254.700 219.580
70 455.964 455.931 514.350 179.025 366.066 297.507 140.906 179.025
80 294.444 294.355 103.507 110.026 173.591 41.355 82.822 110.026
90 168.902 168.723 44.414 59.553 46.972 22.443 45.016 59.553
100 87.186 86.827 21.037 28.438 3.750 10.792 21.736 28.438
Figure 3.9: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 65,
γ = .75, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.9: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = .75,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -133.551 5.307 10.614 14.152 -160.026 5.307 10.614 14.152
40 -134.683 17.115 34.229 45.639 -187.908 17.115 34.229 45.639
50 7.464 37.335 74.670 99.560 -69.260 37.335 74.670 99.560
60 207.794 68.180 136.359 181.812 111.639 68.180 136.359 181.812
70 378.669 124.763 249.527 332.703 258.032 124.763 249.527 332.703
80 243.603 76.290 152.580 203.439 100.899 76.290 152.580 203.439
90 143.641 42.485 84.969 113.292 20.000 42.485 84.969 113.292
100 79.225 21.835 43.669 58.226 987 21.835 43.669 58.226
Figure 3.10: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 70,
γ = .75, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.10: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = .75,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -116.271 -110.772 10.526 14.034 -130.225 5.263 10.526 14.034
40 -96.344 -91.469 33.495 44.661 -125.574 16.748 33.495 44.661
50 69.438 73.546 71.185 94.913 24.621 70.508 71.185 94.913
60 289.483 292.709 122.672 163.563 227.740 165.790 122.672 163.563
70 457.456 459.745 197.205 262.940 369.274 203.014 197.205 262.940
80 295.408 296.786 121.453 161.938 175.112 60.424 121.453 161.938
90 169.454 32.118 66.074 88.099 47.384 32.686 66.074 88.099
100 87.471 14.923 31.981 42.641 3.783 15.582 31.981 42.641
Figure 3.11: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 70,
γ = .75, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.11: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = .75,
and w = 18.474
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -81.078 -81.067 10.950 14.600 -100.482 5.475 10.950 14.600
40 -37.821 -37.803 36.294 48.392 -79.752 18.147 36.294 48.392
50 148.119 148.138 81.478 108.637 81.695 72.234 81.478 108.637
60 402.531 402.540 154.072 205.429 305.407 174.749 154.072 205.429
70 457.223 457.142 171.112 228.149 307.756 85.513 171.112 228.149
80 317.574 317.348 106.146 141.528 129.972 53.020 106.146 141.528
90 202.425 201.976 59.766 79.688 27.862 29.818 59.766 79.688
100 120.828 13.541 30.947 41.263 1.489 15.393 30.947 41.263
Figure 3.12: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 65,
γ = .75, and w = 18.474
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Table 3.12: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65,
γ = .75, and w = 18.474
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -63.821 -63.809 -63.796 14.533 -74.204 -76.914 10.900 14.533
40 4.482 4.505 4.527 47.673 -18.991 -25.432 39.173 47.673
50 222.051 222.079 222.107 143.808 182.327 171.071 155.972 143.808
60 502.327 502.349 502.372 267.562 438.610 422.183 305.224 267.562
70 548.972 548.934 548.896 198.307 440.259 407.717 191.168 198.307
80 382.394 382.282 382.170 124.037 225.256 71.093 92.772 124.037
90 236.918 236.692 50.236 68.147 65.858 25.395 50.795 68.147
100 132.275 131.826 23.639 32.958 5.690 12.162 24.329 32.958
Figure 3.13: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 65,
γ = .75, and w = 18.474
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Table 3.13: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = .75,
and w = 18.474
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -83.633 5.375 10.750 14.334 -105.371 5.375 10.750 14.334
40 -55.849 17.549 35.099 46.798 -103.251 17.549 35.099 46.798
50 94.604 39.027 78.054 104.071 19.391 39.027 78.054 104.071
60 291.288 73.509 147.019 196.025 185.774 73.509 147.019 196.025
70 455.760 140.627 281.254 375.006 309.397 140.627 281.254 375.006
80 316.557 87.236 174.471 232.629 130.665 87.236 174.471 232.629
90 201.777 49.118 98.237 130.982 28.010 49.118 98.237 130.982
100 120.441 25.434 50.867 67.823 1.497 25.434 50.867 67.823
Figure 3.14: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 70,
γ = .75, and w = 18.474
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Table 3.14: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70,
γ = .75, and w = 18.474
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -66.857 -66.846 10.662 14.216 -78.417 5.331 10.662 14.216
40 -16.759 -16.741 34.345 45.794 -42.993 20.473 34.345 45.794
50 160.405 160.425 82.461 99.153 116.261 108.501 82.461 99.153
60 381.155 381.166 133.142 175.996 313.473 215.781 133.142 175.996
70 546.842 546.816 221.263 295.140 440.664 244.926 221.263 295.140
80 380.911 380.765 138.541 184.872 225.463 69.190 138.541 184.872
90 235.999 235.677 76.317 101.942 65.918 38.059 76.317 101.942
100 131.762 131.102 37.182 49.805 5.696 18.468 37.182 49.805
Figure 3.15: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 70,
γ = .75, and w = 18.474
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Table 3.15: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -154.624 -154.615 10.809 14.412 -153.265 -136.385 10.809 14.412
40 -156.130 -156.114 35.391 47.188 -149.496 -142.728 35.391 47.188
50 13.914 13.931 96.399 103.926 30.762 26.262 96.399 103.926
60 271.202 271.210 218.717 190.537 295.443 280.317 218.717 190.537
70 330.012 329.941 154.018 205.593 333.657 285.673 154.018 205.593
80 206.136 205.956 94.081 125.715 179.780 46.876 94.081 125.715
90 117.994 117.641 52.268 70.009 70.742 25.943 52.268 70.009
100 63.728 63.045 26.709 35.980 15.678 13.133 26.709 35.980
Figure 3.16: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 65,
γ = 2, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.16: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -138.670 -138.658 -138.647 -3.284 -133.438 -136.929 10.762 14.349
40 -118.607 -118.586 -118.566 -1.747 -105.975 -113.572 41.906 46.514
50 77.683 77.709 77.734 173.582 100.137 87.920 210.925 165.304
60 354.462 354.482 354.502 427.943 384.144 367.604 455.335 349.716
70 400.545 400.511 400.477 451.900 418.139 400.354 377.939 273.739
80 251.447 251.358 251.268 142.680 244.034 227.960 95.016 110.478
90 140.054 139.877 52.626 59.871 107.081 36.271 44.852 60.079
100 70.544 70.190 21.379 28.806 27.577 10.763 21.545 29.047
Figure 3.17: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 65,
γ = 2, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.17: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -159.186 -904 10.614 14.152 -161.048 5.307 10.614 14.152
40 -178.395 -45.527 34.229 45.639 -178.662 17.115 34.229 45.639
50 -45.675 59.980 74.670 99.560 -39.031 54.884 74.670 99.560
60 153.870 232.313 136.359 181.812 169.097 140.448 136.359 181.812
70 331.181 384.785 249.527 332.703 338.148 180.764 249.527 332.703
80 206.867 240.128 152.580 203.439 182.200 75.878 152.580 203.439
90 118.412 42.197 84.969 113.292 71.694 42.006 84.969 113.292
100 63.953 21.501 43.669 58.226 15.889 21.280 43.669 58.226
Figure 3.18: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 70,
γ = 2, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.18: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2,
and w = 19.180
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -143.681 -143.672 10.526 14.034 -140.129 -144.792 10.526 14.034
40 -144.140 -144.125 33.495 44.661 -135.109 -145.279 33.495 44.661
50 9.850 9.867 101.034 97.882 26.990 10.496 101.034 97.882
60 227.491 227.499 215.282 175.435 252.672 229.630 215.282 175.435
70 401.845 401.818 263.231 262.822 421.811 395.146 263.231 262.822
80 252.263 252.146 121.153 161.801 246.177 148.090 121.153 161.801
90 140.508 140.258 65.726 87.940 108.021 32.904 65.726 87.940
100 70.773 70.259 31.577 42.457 27.819 15.836 31.577 42.457
Figure 3.19: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 70,
γ = 2, and w = 19.180
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Table 3.19: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2,
and w = 17.179
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -83.965 -83.956 11.574 15.432 -83.481 -87.603 11.574 15.432
40 -69.438 -69.424 40.545 54.061 -65.543 -76.327 40.545 54.061
50 74.719 74.730 111.946 130.672 86.732 65.996 111.945 130.672
60 303.646 303.638 223.034 274.570 323.134 290.319 223.034 274.570
70 384.012 383.846 249.739 333.148 384.430 339.989 249.739 333.148
80 278.979 278.531 161.069 214.999 241.387 80.527 161.069 214.999
90 184.577 183.732 93.382 124.866 110.040 46.680 93.382 124.866
100 114.529 112.971 49.148 66.058 28.076 24.557 49.148 66.058
Figure 3.20: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 65,
γ = 2, and w = 17.179
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Table 3.20: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 65, γ = 2,
and w = 17.179
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -74.530 -74.517 -74.504 7.232 -71.823 -74.252 -2.199 15.363
40 -42.999 -42.977 -42.955 39.971 -35.012 -41.380 28.544 54.876
50 127.318 127.371 127.371 207.424 144.290 131.978 194.087 181.911
60 383.541 383.559 383.577 455.720 409.774 389.943 437.628 362.738
70 464.774 464.692 464.609 523.872 482.643 458.283 418.706 319.558
80 341.009 340.770 340.532 315.589 329.737 305.199 141.569 189.029
90 220.571 220.122 219.674 107.788 168.388 97.841 80.843 108.192
100 128.069 127.235 40.736 53.611 50.103 19.872 40.212 54.209
Figure 3.21: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 65,
γ = 2, and w = 17.179

















Fair, Payroll  Tax .00
Fair, Payroll Tax .03
Fair, Payroll Tax .06
Fair, Payroll Tax .08
pos












Fair, Payroll Tax .00
Fair, Payroll Tax .03
Fair, Payroll Tax .06
Fair, Payroll Tax .08
pos
















ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .00
ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .03
ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .06
ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .08
pos














ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .00
ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .03
ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .06
ϖ=.50, Payroll Tax .08
pos
117
Table 3.21: Wealth by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2,
and w = 17.179
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -82.845 5.684 11.368 15.157 -83.863 5.684 11.368 15.157
40 -78.476 18.159 39.266 52.355 -78.544 19.633 39.266 52.355
50 35.432 125.669 94.106 125.475 40.192 70.070 94.106 125.475
60 207.103 285.643 197.045 262.727 218.404 141.156 197.045 262.727
70 377.514 440.222 434.040 578.721 380.069 216.764 434.040 578.721
80 274.258 302.964 280.111 373.481 238.648 139.675 280.111 373.481
90 181.454 80.987 162.681 216.908 108.792 80.778 162.681 216.908
100 112.591 42.508 86.064 114.752 27.757 42.199 86.064 114.752
Figure 3.22: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 1960 (Men). J = 70,
γ = 2, and w = 17.179
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Table 3.22: Wealth by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). Case J = 70, γ = 2,
and w = 17.179
Fair ̟ = .50
Age 0 3 6 8 0 3 6 8
20 0 6 12 15 0 6 12 15
30 -73.324 -73.314 11.276 15.034 -71.477 -74.799 11.276 15.034
40 -54.083 -54.067 38.425 51.216 -48.355 -57.091 38.425 51.216
50 81.022 81.036 119.265 119.304 93.862 76.773 119.265 119.394
60 276.509 276.506 223.591 234.501 298.097 269.414 223.591 234.501
70 455.388 455.337 337.427 450.221 474.409 435.534 337.427 450.221
80 334.122 333.807 221.146 295.334 324.112 190.385 221.146 295.334
90 216.116 215.453 126.312 169.115 165.516 63.320 126.312 169.115
100 125.483 124.202 62.870 84.862 49.248 31.677 62.870 84.862
Figure 3.23: Consumption and A.E.W. by Age: Cohort 2000 (Men). J = 70,
γ = 2, and w = 17.179
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Demography and Uncertainty in
Economic Growth: An
Application to Social Security
The aim of this chapter is to develop an OLG growth model, with
realistic demography, that enables us to track each individual throughout
her life-cycle. To do so, we use a longitudinal accounting to analyze
the optimal allocation process of each individual, rather than the cross-
sectional accounting, most frequently used. As a result, we find that
there exist multiple steady states, e.g. the “modified golden rule” and
the “golden rule” are feasible equilibria. Subsequently, we apply this
model for studying the impact of a social security system on economic
growth. Thus, we also find that both funded and unfunded systems can
achieve the same steady state either the “modified golden rule”, or the
“golden rule”. However, the dynamic transition of each social security
system to the same steady state differs.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I propose to study how each social security system, either funded or
unfunded, affects economic growth. A first approach to this issue was accomplished
by Feldstein (1974). He pointed out by using a time-series study that the U.S. pay-
as-you-go social security system depresses personal savings. This negative impact
on capital stock, and thus on economic growth, is explained by the deadweight
losses that create the collection of payroll taxes to finance retirement benefits. In
particular, Boskin and Hurd (1978) show that an unfunded system distorts the
labor supply and it diminishes savings over the life cycle due to differences in the
marginal propensity to consume between aged and young people as well. However,
the negative impact of the unfunded social security is far from being widely accepted,
since many results rely on several restrictive assumptions about the behavior of the
economic agent, the population structure, and even market features, among others.
The main advantage of this lack of consensus is the increasing research on the
effect of social security on the economy. For example, by means of simulations we
know that an unfunded social security, introduced into an economy composed of
selfish individuals, crowds out the stock of physical capital, Auerbach (1987). But
if individuals have altruistic feelings, Fuster et al. (2003) and Fuster (1999), the
crowding out effect is reduced or eliminated. Also, there exists a crowding out when
an actuarially fair social security is introduced into an economy with market failures
in the provision of private annuities, Hubbard (1987) and Abel (1985). However,
simulations of partial equilibrium models do not give a complete view of the effects
produced by a social security in the long run, given that a complete understanding
of this issue requires the knowledge of how every economic variable evolve as time
goes by.
This chapter therefore develops an OLG growth model, with realistic demogra-
phy, that enables us to track each individual throughout her life cycle. Thus, we
extend the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model1 by introducing a longitudinal account-
1Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) analyze the evolution of the consumption
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ing framework, instead of the cross-sectional accounting most frequently used. This
approach to the problem has been already attempted by Bommier and Lee (2003).2
Nonetheless, this model differs from Bommier and Lee (2003) in two aspects. On
the one side, we present a longitudinal accounting framework that more easily al-
lows economic interpretation. This is partly because we do not need to differentiate
with respect to time and age. On the other side, this model is based on the Cass-
Koopmans-Ramsey model instead of the Gale (1973) model. Other related papers
such as Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) and Blanchard (1985) considered a dynamic con-
tinuous model with lifetime uncertainty as well. However, their models do not have
a longitudinal accounting.
The results of this chapter show that a realistic demography coupled with the lon-
gitudinal accounting framework modifies the usual dynamic function of consumption
per capita. Thus, in general, there will exist three kinds of steady state equilibria:
i) golden rule equilibrium in which the interest rate equals the population growth
rate as in Phelps (1966), ii) modified golden-rule equilibrium in which the inter-
est rate equals the subjective discount factor plus a proportion of the population
growth rate, and iii) a non-trivial equilibrium which depends on both economic and
demographic variables. We also find that both funded and unfunded social security
systems achieve the golden rule and the modified golden-rule equilibria. Therefore,
contrary to previous research, an unfunded social security has no effect on saving
rates and capital accumulation in the long run. However, there exists a temporal
intergenerational problem along the transition to the steady state caused by the
unfunded system. During this transition, there seems to be a crowding out effect on
the stock of physical capital.
The model has five features. First, the economy is closed to both migration
and investments from other economies. Second, there exits a productive firm that
and the stock of physical capital through the interaction between competitive firms and maximizing
consumers. The main feature of these models is that the saving rate is an endogenous variable.
2This paper presents an excellent overview about the evolution of the use of demography in
economic models.
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combines labor and physical capital to produce a storable good, which can be either
consumed or saved by each individual. Third, the population is composed of selfish
people who face an uncertain length of life. Therefore, there are no intergenerational
transfers. Fourth, each individual supplies her labor inelastically up to the age of
retirement. This fact has a twofold implication. On the one hand, the population
is divided into workers and retirees and, on the other hand, individuals save for a
precautionary motive. Fifth, a selfish individual will prefer, following Yaari (1965),
to purchase annuities, hence we assume that there exists a risk pooling that offers
actuarially fair private annuities.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 presents the lon-
gitudinal accounting framework applied to our population. We show how both
cross-sectional and longitudinal frameworks are similar at any time. Some useful
demographic functions and how they evolve over time will be also explained. Sec-
tion 4.3 is devoted to developing the longitudinal accounting framework for the
economic variables. Thus, the main aggregate and per capita functions, as well as
their dynamic motion equations, are presented. Section 4.4 introduces the economic
framework and analyzes the main results in an economy without social security.
The impact of social security on economic growth is introduced in section 4.5. This
Section is divided into two subsections in order to study the consequences to the
economy of both funded and unfunded systems. Section 4.6 concludes. Section 4.7
contains an Appendix with the main proofs. Finally, some simulations complete the
chapter.
4.2 Demographic Accounting Framework
A growth economic model with realistic demography is based on the structure of its
population and its size over time. As a first step, we will set up the demographic
background. Henceforth, we assume a “closed population” (no migration flows) that
only changes through births B and deaths D. Thus, the population growth rate at
time t, denoted as n(t), corresponds to the crude birth rate minus the flow of deaths
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per capita at time t, b(t) − d(t). Let us call those people who were born in year x
“cohort x”. The size of the cohort x at age s will be given by Ωx(s)B(x), where
Ωx(s) is the probability that an individual who was born in year x will be alive at
age s (see Definition 4.1 in the appendix). Therefore, the size of our population at
time t, denoted as P (t), is derived by adding up the size of every cohort alive at
that time.
There are two different ways of calculating P (t), either in a cross-sectional per-









Ωx(t− x)B(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Longitudinal
(4.1)
where T is the maximum age, or longevity, of any individual. In this chapter, we use
the longitudinal accounting, instead of the cross-sectional, because of the following
two reasons. First, we do not need to differentiate with respect to time and age
in order to derive the evolution of any socio-economic variable over time. With
longitudinal accounting we simply need to differentiate with respect to time. Second,
the longitudinal accounting enables us to simultaneously analyze the behavior of
an individual both at age s and over her life cycle. Thus, given this accounting
framework, we will proceed in each scenario by analyzing the individual life-cycle
behavior, and then obtain the aggregate results.
Equation (4.1) is useful for aggregate functions but, for the sake of consistency
with respect to previous growth models, we are also interested in per capita variables.
The size per capita of the cohort x at time t is defined as px(t− x):






Then, equation (4.2) evolves over time according to the following law of motion:
p˙x(t− x) = −(µx(t− x) + n(t))px(t− x), with t ≥ x, (4.3)
where µx(t − x) is the instantaneous mortality rate3 of an individual of age t − x,
being born at year x. In addition to equation (4.2), let us denote p˜(t − x) as the
3µ is also called by demographers as “mortality hazard rate” and by actuaries as “force of
mortality”.
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stable cohort x per capita at time t. From (4.3), p˜(t−x) has the following expression:
p˜(t− x) = Ω(t− x)be−n(t−x), t ≥ x. (4.4)












Previous models, such as Blanchard (1985)4, assume that the population is sta-
tionary (n(t) = 0,∀t) and that the instantaneous mortality rate is constant along the
lifespan. On the contrary, and following Bommier and Lee (2003), we will consider
a realistic mortality rate, since it improves our theoretical results and it does not
introduce too much complexity into the model. Nonetheless, our main findings will
be presented under a “stable population” structure. That is, the population grows
at a rate equal to n, and so the size of any cohort per capita will remain constant
over time.
Figure 4.1 above shows three hypothetical distributions of stable cohorts per
capita according to age and population growth rate. Note that we only need to
change the value of n in order to obtain a young age pyramid (n > 0, solid line) or
an aging age pyramid (n < 0, dotted line).
4An individual with a constant instantaneous mortality rate has the same life expectancy at any
age. According to this fact, her marginal propensity to consume will be constant over time.
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4.3 Aggregate and Per Capita Functions
We will now develop an accounting framework to describe aggregate variables, per
capita variables and an individual counterpart at time t, in which any realistic
demography could be considered. In addition, we will also calculate how the previous
variables evolve over time in order to determine their steady states.
We denote aggregate variables by uppercase letters Z, per capita variables by
lowercase letters z, and an individual’s variable by a lowercase letter followed by a
subscript zx.





zx(t− x)Ωx(t− x)B(x)dx. (4.5)
Equation (4.5) means that the aggregate value of any variable corresponds to the
sum of the cohort’s average values of that variable times the number of people
within the cohort. For example, aggregate consumption is the sum of the average
consumption of each cohort, multiplied by the number of people within the cohort.







zx(t− x)px(t− x)dx. (4.6)
The interpretation of equation (4.6) is simple. z is the average value of Z for our
population at time t.
So far, we have shown our variable z only in a specific moment. We are now
interested in knowing how equations (4.5) and (4.6) evolve. So, we will differentiate








µx(t− x)zx(t− x)px(t− x)dx, (4.7)
and
Z˙(t) = P (t)(z˙(t) + n(t)z(t)). (4.8)
5The subscript denotes the year in which the individual was born.
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To understand (4.7), we divide it into three terms. The first integral represents
how z evolves for each current cohort. The second term represents that z decreases
through dilution due to population growth and, finally, the third term depicts how
z may change because of the increment produced by newborns and the reduction
caused through deaths. This third part has not been taken into account before,
except by Bommier and Lee (2003). However, it is crucial for analyzing growth
models with overlapping generations, since young and old people do not necessarily
allocate the same amount of their resources for a given variable z, as is generally
considered. For example, according to (4.7), previous models are implicitly assuming
that consumption of newborns, b(t)ct(0), equals the consumption of those people who




µx(t− x)cx(t− x)px(t− x)dx.
In order to better understand this inconsistency, we can imagine a stationary popu-
lation structure. Under this demographic scenario, this equality only holds whenever
the consumption of old people is the same as that of young people. Meanwhile, under
an aging population, it holds only if old people consume less than young people. In
sum, we can conclude that the latter equality does not seem to be realistic according
to theoretical age-consumption profiles.
On the other hand, equation (4.8) suggests that, despite the fact that population
growth diminishes per capita variables, aggregate variables are nonetheless positively
affected by population growth.
4.4 Economic Framework
In our closed economy, there is only one firm that combines labor L and physical
capital K to produce a single commodity or output, as a whole F . For simplicity,
we assume that F is an homogeneous function of degree one, and that there is no
technological progress. Thus, the production function takes the following modified
intensive form
F (t) = P (t)f(k(t), l(t)) ≡ P (t)f(t) (4.9)
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where k(t) = K(t)
P (t) is the physical capital per capita at time t, and l(t) =
L(t)
P (t) is
the ratio workers-population at time t. Finally, f satisfies the conditions, f ≥ 0,
fk, fl ≥ 0, fkk, fll ≤ 0, and fkl = flk ≥ 0, as well as the Inada conditions.
We assume that each individual supplies her labor force inelastically up to the
age of J years old, in exchange of a salary w that corresponds to the marginal
productivity of labor
w(t) = fl(k(t), l(t)).
Afterwards, she decides to retire. Hence, the population at time t can be divided
into workers L(t) and retirees Lr(t)
P (t) = L(t) + Lr(t) =
∫ t
t−J





Ωx(t− x)B(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retirees
. (4.10)
It is worth noting that by introducing retirees in our closed economy, there will be
savings for the retirement motive. Furthermore, this assumption gives us insight into
the consequences to the economy caused by a population with longer life expectancy.
Therefore, it helps to determine the optimal retirement age, and even to study
feasible policies for balancing this unfavorable circumstance with the social security
system.
Individuals are assumed to have perfect foresight and do not have a bequest
motive (selfish), so they only receive satisfaction through consumption c. In addition
to these facts and with the intention of maximizing their utility, they constitute a
pool for insuring their risk of mortality. Therefore, they purchase actuarially fair
annuities in order to not outlive their resources in the case of survival beyond their
life expectancy. This annuity contract has two important features. First, after
paying the premium and if the individual survives at the end of the annuity contract,
she will receive the marginal productivity of physical capital, or the safe interest rate
r
r(t) = fk(k(t), l(t)),
plus a risk premium µ contingent on her mortality risk. However, if she does not
survive at the end of the annuity contract, she will lose her premium. Second, the
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purchase of annuities leads to newborns not receiving bequests. As a consequence,
individuals start their life-cycle without physical capital. According to this economic
scenario and following Yaari (1965), each individual belonging to any cohort x can
be economically characterized by the following dynamic budget constraint:





w(t) if 0 < t− x < J
0 if t− x ≥ J
(4.12)
and
kx(0) = 0. (4.13)
This dynamic budget constraint shows two key features. On the one hand, the
greater physical capital rate of return is due to the fact that the individual purchases
annuities. In particular, µx(t− x)kx(t− x) corresponds to the proportion of wealth
transferred from people within the cohort x who are recently deceased. On the other
hand, by aggregating every individual within the economy we are able to see that
lifetime uncertainty does not affect the stock of physical capital K in the short run.
However, it does affect the future stock of physical capital in the long run through
consumption. Consequently, we also need to study how consumption evolves over
time.
If an individual’s preferences can be represented by a CRRA utility function and
every individual maximizes their lifetime utility, then the dynamic of consumption
will be
c˙x(t− x) = r(t)− δ
γ
cx(t− x) for all t ≥ x, (4.14)
where γ > 0 is the constant risk aversion coefficient, and δ is the subjective discount
parameter. Equation (4.14), known as the Euler Equation, implies that any individ-
ual of the cohort x will consume more (resp. less) at some date t+ dt whenever the
market interest rate is greater (resp. lower) than her subjective discount factor.6
6Equation (4.14) holds at t+dt if, and only if, we assume that individuals have perfect foresight
about their future earnings.
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Accordingly, as long as r(t) ≥ δ we will expect that every present and future cohort
will have a non decreasing consumption throughout her life-cycle.
The Dynamics of the Economy
Thus far, we have established the optimal individual behavior of any person within a
cohort x, when she purchases actuarially fair private annuities and there is no social
security system. Now we will use our longitudinal accounting framework to describe
the evolution of this economy in terms of the aggregate variables: consumption per
capita c(t) and physical capital per capita k(t) at any time t.
Our aim is to derive the stationary state, or stationary states, of this economy.
To do so, we first proceed by deriving how physical capital and consumption evolve.
Second, we will calculate the singular or multiple steady states of the economy.
We will begin by deriving the dynamic of physical capital per capita. Thus, we
combine equation (4.7) with the optimal consumer’s allocation process depicted by
equations (4.11), (4.13), and (4.14). As a result, the dynamic of physical capital per
capita at time t is
k˙(t) = f(t)− c(t)− n(t)k(t). (4.15)
This physical capital dynamic is the same as that in Solow (1956), Blanchard (1985),
Bommier and Lee (2003), among many others. This is so, as we have already
pointed out, because annuities transfer the wealth from deceased individuals to
those individuals who are alive at the end of the annuity contract.
Similarly as in previous analyses, the latter equation also implies that in the
steady state, or steady states, consumption per capita should be equal to
c = f − nk = (r − n)k + wl. (4.16)
And as a consequence, by using equation (4.8), both aggregate physical capital and
aggregate consumption will grow in a stationary state at a constant rate equal to n,
independently of both the number of workers and the stock of physical capital per








These previous results are all well-known. However, the problem arises when we
study the dynamic of consumption per capita. Contrary to the variable physical
capital per capita, we do not expect that consumption of those people who are born
at time t, ct(0)b(t), equals the consumption of people recently deceased, φc(t)c(t).
In fact, the former can be either greater, or equal, or lower than the latter.7 By







c(t) + ct(0)b(t)− φc(t)c(t), (4.17)
where φc(t)c(t) is equal to∫ t
t−T
µx(t− x)cx(t− x)px(t− x)dx.
Equation (4.17) says that the dynamic of consumption per capita is not well es-
timated, unless we subtract the consumption of people recently deceased, at the
same time as we add the newborns’ consumption. Unfortunately, because variables
ct(0) and cx(t− x) depend on the interest rate r(t), the stationary consumption per
capita (c˙ = 0) is very difficult to obtain, perhaps even impossible, for a non-stable
population. Consequently, we will assume henceforth that our population is stable.
On the other hand, in steady states the dependence of t disappears. Thus, we can
use the cross-sectional accounting, instead of the longitudinal accounting, in order
to derive steady states. Thus, the next theorem gives the necessary conditions for a
stationary economy under the cross-sectional accounting framework.
Theorem 4.1 Let us assume a closed population that faces an uncertain length of
life and grows at a constant rate equal to n. If private markets offer actuarially
fair annuities, then consumption per capita and physical capital per capita will be
stationary for any interest rate that satisfies either:
r = δ + γn, (4.18)
or








7This result is different from that of the variable physical capital mainly stems from the fact
that consumption is not a stock variable.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 4.1 claims that, given a constant population growth rate, there can
be more than one feasible equilibrium point in the economy. We find that one of
the multiple steady states corresponds to the consumption and physical capital per
capita in which r is equal to δ+γn. This steady state is known as “the modified golden
rule”. We also find that whenever the equation (4.19) is satisfied, the modified golden
rule is not the only steady state that this economy can reach. In fact, according to
(4.19) there can be two additional steady states. One is a non-trivial steady state
that not only depends on socio-demographic variables {J, T,Ω, b, and d}, but also
on economic variables {r, w, γ and δ} (point III in Figure 4.2). The other is a steady
state that corresponds to the “golden rule” condition, r = n or point I in Figure
4.2.
The number of steady states in an annuitized economy depends on the population
growth rate. While a growing population (see figure 4.2) presents three steady
states, a decreasing population has either two or only one steady states depending







has two steady states. This economy cannot reach the golden rule
equilibrium. On the other hand, if the population growth rate is lower than − δ
γ
,
this economy will only have one steady state. In this particular case, the modified
golden rule condition will not be attainable.
Figure 4.2: The Dynamic of Consumption per Capita for an Annuitized














Analyzing the phase diagram and the eigenvalues associated to each equilibrium
point, we can study whether each equilibrium is an attractor point or not. Note
that our dynamic system is not linear, hence we will proceed linearizing equations
(4.15) and (4.17) in the neighborhood of each steady state which satisfies theorem

















































Equation (4.21) shows that the eigenvalues can take not only both positive and
negative values, but also complex ones. Looking at figure 4.2 we see that ∂c˙
∂k
is
positive in the neighborhood of points I and III, and yet the slope at each point is
different. Through some simulations we have found that if the economy has three
equilibria, the middle steady state will be a saddle point, and the remaining equilibria
will be one stable and one unstable focus. Therefore, this economy can present four
different paths: i) a spiral sink, ii) a saddle path, iii) an unstable spiral, and finally
iv) a limit cycle between the attractor and the repeller equilibrium points. Three of
the four paths describe oscillated movements. Thus, it is more likely to see economic
cycles, even with perfect foresight agents. On the other hand, an economy with two
equilibria has an unstable focus and a saddle point. This economy will only have
one, instead of two, attractor equilibrium. Finally, an economy with a population
growth rate lower than − δ
γ
has a repeller equilibrium point.
Figure 4.3 below shows the phase diagram of an annuitized economy with a
growing population, and a constant risk aversion coefficient greater than one, and
which is associated with Figure 4.2. According to the population growth rate, there

























are three steady states (I, II and III). Point I corresponds to the golden rule interest
rate, and point II is the modified golden rule interest rate. Obviously, the steady
state that this economy can reach without social security will depend on initial values
of consumption and physical capital per capita. It is worth noting that so long as
the economy moves towards point I or point III, many economic variables (e.g. the
wage, the interest rates, the consumption per capita, and the physical capital per
capita) will have an oscillated motion.
Figure 4.3: The Phase Diagram for an Annuitized Economy with Perfect


















After analyzing every feasible steady state, it is clear that whenever the economy
reaches an equilibrium, neither the interest rate, nor the salary is generally modi-
fied. This is true except when the steady state is located in point III. However,
and although both factor prices do not change when any steady state is attained,
differences among countries may still appear due to demographic factors. For exam-
ple, we find that both the consumption and the stock of physical capital per capita
are negatively affected by the proportion of retirees. If we analyze two stationary
economies with the same population growth but different life expectancies after the
date of retirement, then the economy with the greater life expectancy will have a
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lower consumption and physical capital per capita than the economy with the lower
life expectancy. This is because individuals in both economies earn the same wage
and have the same interest rate. However, individuals with a greater life expectancy
need to consume less in order to spread their consumption over their life-cycle, as
Levhari and Mirman (1977) have already pointed out.9
4.5 Impact of Social Security in Economic Growth
The social security system has been widely criticized because it causes a crowding out
effect on both the stock of physical capital and labor market or, equivalently, it has
a negative impact on individuals’ decision about retirement and saving. These con-
clusions were pointed out by Feldstein (1974) and Boskin and Hurd (1978), among
many others. In addition, the unfunded method of financing Social Security has
been identified as the worst method when one anticipates an aging population. This
demographic scenario undoubtedly yields either a higher payroll tax for workers,
reducing their disposable income, or a lower benefit for retirees, or a combination of
both. However, there are many other effects that have not been extensively studied
in a growth model so far. For example, how Social Security affects the steady state
when realistic demography is taken into account has not been addressed. A pioneer
work in this field is Bommier and Lee (2003). They find that a closed economy with
capital and a social security system is able to reach a steady state that is either
“golden rule” or “balanced”.10 Following the idea of multiple equilibria, we also
show that both a funded and an unfunded social security can reach a steady state
that is either “golden rule”, or “modified golden rule”. Nonetheless, both social
security systems are not completely equivalent even with a stable population, since
they approach the steady state following different trajectories. According to this
result, the crowding out effect produced by an unfunded social security does not
continue forever, suggesting that it is just a temporal intergenerational problem.
9As a consequence, this decrement in consumption can be balanced by either extending the age
of retirement, or increasing the productivity.
10They extended the OLG growth model of Gale (1973) by introducing a productive firm.
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4.5.1 Funded Social Security
To start the analysis we first consider an actuarially fair and funded social security
system. In order to focus on the study of the pension system, we leave aside common
social security expenditures such as health care, unemployment, etc. Consequently,
we assume that Social Security only levies a payroll tax τ on gross earnings, in
exchange of a future benefit b when people retire. The equation (4.12) can be




(1− τ)w(t) if 0 < t− x < J
bx(t− x) if t− x ≥ J
where














Equation (4.22) shows that our individual receives a flat pension benefit at retire-
ment. b has the feature of being actuarially fair, and so the retiree receives the same
return as if she would have invested her savings in the private market. However, this
fact does not necessarily mean that a funded system is not affected by the population
growth rate. According to this framework, the amount of money received through
pension benefits will depend on both the interest rate and the survival probability.
Thus, if b depends on the interest rate which, at the same time, is a function of the
population growth rate, then the funded system will be affected by n as well. In
order to show this influence and its implications for the economy, we have included
the Figure 4.4 below.
In this figure we present four economic transitions, from a golden rule equilibrium
to another golden equilibrium for different demographic changes. Subsequently, we
will compare these results with the analogous case showed of the unfunded system
shown in Figure 4.5.
First, we should note that a funded social security does not modify the individ-
ual allocation process depicted by equations from (4.11) to (4.14).11 Therefore, the
11Given this economic framework, both funded and unfunded social security systems only affect
the dynamic of consumption per capita c˙ on the initial consumption, cx(0). Using algebra we can
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Figure 4.4: Economic Transitions between Equilibria Points: Funded
Social Security























Retirement Age: from 65 to 70.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 73,5.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 77,5.
Population Growth Rate: from 1% to 1,5%.
(a) Consumption per capita c˙(t)





















Retirement Age: from 65 to 70.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 73,5.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 77,5.
Population Growth Rate: from 1% to 1,5%.
(b) Physical Capital per capita k˙(t)
Note. The analysis assumes a CES production function A (θkα + (1− θ)lα) 1α , where the
parameters used are {A = 2093, θ = 1
3
, α = −0.131855}, and δ = 0.01, and γ = 1. The
other parameters are reported in the figure.
































Note that if we substitute b by equation (4.22), the initial consumption will be the same as in the

























steady states of this economy are the same as those equilibria obtained in the bench-
mark economy explained in Section 4.4. Secondly, we have chosen the golden rule
equilibrium in this Figure because, on the one hand, it is the steady state in which
the population maximizes its welfare, and, on the other hand, it is an attractor point
which makes easier future comparisons.12
Figure 4.4 shows that an economy with a funded social security is negatively
affected by an increase in both the life expectancy (dotted line, and dotted-dashed
line) and the population growth rate (dashed line). In contrast, delaying the manda-
tory age of retirement from 65 years old to 70 years old raises both consumption and
physical capital per capita. Therefore, the latter policy seems to be the most conve-
nient in the case of having a growing population with an increasing life expectancy.
We can also observe from Figure 4.4 that a funded system does not contain many
cyclical movements, since the number of cycles depend on the number of oscillations.
On the other hand, and contrary to the unfunded system, these economic transi-
tions are independent of the payroll tax levied even though both consumption and
physical capital per capita are modified at an individual level. This circumstance
plays an important role in the next subsection through the number of oscillations.
4.5.2 Unfunded Social Security
Under an unfunded social security system, current workers support the pension
benefits received by retirees, redistributing income over multiple generations. The
pension benefits at time t in this case is:
bx(t− x) = τw(t)
∫ t





This pension benefit is a function of both the population structure through l(t)
and the current economic status through w(t). Consequently, an unfunded social
security system is more affected than a funded system by the population structure
at any time. Now, comparing the pension benefit received from a pure funded social
12Unfortunately, the time passed in reaching another steady state is too long for a stable popu-
lation. By contrast, an economy with a demographic transition has faster movements.
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security, see equation (4.22), with that of an unfunded social security, we can observe
under steady state conditions that the following relationship is satisfied:







if r > n






if r < n
. (4.24)
The importance of this relationship for our analysis is twofold. One, it helps to give
insight into which system yields a greater pension benefit for a given payroll tax τ .
Thus, once we know the steady state, we can specify which social security system
yields a greater welfare. Second, because an unfunded social security does not offer
the same return as private markets, initial consumption is not the same as that in a
funded system. Therefore, we may wonder whether an unfunded system affects the
steady states that this economy reaches.
It is easy to see from theorem 4.1 that the modified golden rule is independent
of the sort of social security system that an economy has. However, equation (4.18)
is not the same, due to the initial consumption. In particular, c(0) now has the
following expression













Equation (4.25) shows that regarding (4.24) c(0) is greater (resp. lower) under
an unfunded system than c(0) under a funded system whenever r < (resp. >) n.
Therefore, we can claim that an unfunded social security leaves the population better
(resp. worse) off whenever an stationary economy will have an interest rate lower
(resp. greater) than the population growth rate. Following this reasoning, we find
that
Proposition 4.1 Under the golden rule equilibrium both funded and unfunded social
security systems yield the same welfare for every cohort.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, if the economy is in the golden rule equilibrium, there will be no interest
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in switching from one social security system to another.13 That is, every individual
will have the same consumption trajectory under both social security systems. In
addition to proposition 4.1, we also find that
Proposition 4.2 Both funded and unfunded social security systems can reach either
the modified golden rule, or the golden rule equilibrium.
The proof is obvious from the observation of theorem 4.1 and proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 gives three equilibria for a growing population. In fact, it is not
included in proposition 4.2 because both systems do not attain the same non-trivial
steady states showed in figure 4.3. On the other hand, it is important to note that
insofar as r = δ+γn will be lower than n, an unfunded system will be more desirable
than a funded system, and vice versa. Therefore, the risk aversion coefficient γ and
the subjective discount factor δ seem to be crucial variables for determining the
optimal social security system under this model.
According to proposition 4.2, the non-trivial steady state is the only equilibrium
point that changes. However, it is not the optimal equilibrium, since it does not max-
imize the aggregate consumption as the golden rule does. Given this circumstance,
we will focus henceforth on the golden rule equilibrium.
We have pointed out that an unfunded social security modifies the dynamic of
consumption per capita. Hence, the eigenvalues reported in equation (4.21) differ




. If we consider
that the golden rule is a spiral sink, we can assure that the speed of convergence
from an initial state (k0, c0) to the steady state (k
∗, c∗) is the same for both systems.
In other words, in both systems the real point of the eigenvalues Re(λ) is equal.
However, the imaginary part of the eigenvalues Im(λ) for both systems are not equal.
As a consequence, an unfunded system moves towards the equilibrium describing a
different trajectory then a funded system. Figure 4.5 shows the economic transitions
from a golden rule equilibrium to another under the same demographic changes
13Of course, the population growth rate should be positive due to the impossibility that the
interest rate will be negative.
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introduced in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.5: Economic Transitions between Equilibria Points: Unfunded
Social Security (τ = 0.08)























Retirement Age: from 65 to 70.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 73,5.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 77,5.
Population Growth Rate: from 1% to 1,5%.
(a) Consumption per capita c˙(t)





















Retirement Age: from 65 to 70.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 73,5.
Life Expectancy: from 70 to 77,5.
Population Growth Rate: from 1% to 1,5%.
(b) Physical Capital per capita k˙(t)
Note. The analysis assumes a CES production function A (θkα + (1− θ)lα) 1α , where the
parameters used are {A = 2093, θ = 1
3
, α = −0.131855}, and δ = 0.01, and γ = 1. The
other parameters are reported in the figure.
Looking at figures 4.4 and 4.5 we can see how both systems reach the same equi-
libria, although the economic trajectories vary between social security systems. In
particular, an unfunded system has more oscillations than a funded system. The
number of oscillations grows as the payroll tax raises. Furthermore, an important
finding shown in Figure 4.5 is that a negative demographic impact affects an un-
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funded system more heavily than a funded system. Also, a positive demographic
impact to the economy causes the physical capital per capita to grow at the begin-
ning faster under a funded system than under an unfunded one. Therefore, given
a demographic change, the economic transition between two golden rule equilibria
is a temporal intergenerational problem, which is better off under a funded system
only at the beginning of the transition.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter shows that both the introduction of realistic demography and a longi-
tudinal accounting have very important effects in economic growth models. Under a
Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model, we find that there exist multiple equilibria. For ex-
ample, for a positive population growth rate, there exist three equilibria: i) golden
rule, ii) modified golden-rule, and iii) a non-trivial equilibrium which depends on
both economic and demographic variables. We also find that the number of steady
states is an increasing function of the population growth rate, which goes from a
minimum of one to a maximum of three. Further, the equilibrium paths not only
can be a saddle path, but also a spiral sink and an unstable spiral. Therefore, this
model with an usual production function leads to cyclical movements even with
perfect foresight agents.
Afterwards, we have applied the model to study the impact of social security on
economic growth. We find that both funded and unfunded social security systems
can achieve either the modified golden-rule or the golden rule equilibrium. However,
only under the golden rule equilibrium do both systems yield the same welfare for
every individual. This first result suggests that Social Security does not crowd out
the stock of physical capital in the long run, although it does before the economy
reaches the steady state. Second, whether an unfunded system is preferred than a




Definition 4.2 Let Ω ∈ C2([0, T )) denote the rational discount function. That is,
the probability that the consumer will be alive at age s. Ω has the following properties:
1. Ω(0) = 1.
2. lims→T Ω(s) = 0.
3. 0 < Ω(s) ≤ 1.





Ω(s) = µ(s) > 0.
where µ ∈ C∞([0, T )) is the instantaneous mortality rate.
6. The mortality hazard rate µ is an increasing function of age14
d
ds
µ(s) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ [0, T ).
7. In particular, the probability of being alive at age x is given by the following
mapping:
Ω : [0, T ) → (0, 1]
s 7→ Ω(s) = e−
∫ s
0 µ(τ)dτ
Proof of Theorem 4.1. In order to prove theorem 4.1, we will proceed in two
steps. First, we will derive the two necessary conditions for a steady state economy.
Second, we will show how the golden rule interest rate also satisfies this theorem.
We use the cross-sectional accounting framework because we have assumed that
the population is stable. By hypothesis, the optimal consumption of any individual





,∀s ∈ [0, T ).
14In general, this is not true at young ages, although it is assumed for the sake of simplicity.
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Thus, by plugging the consumption trajectory into equation (4.17), the dynamic of






















Using the definition 4.2, property 5, we know that −µ(s)Ω(s) can be substituted
by dΩ(s)
ds







and dv as dΩ(s), and applying the rule
u · v|T0 −
∫ T




















A steady state economy should satisfy that k˙ = 0 ⇔ c = f−nk. Furthermore, given
that f is a homogeneous function of degree one, we know that the latter condition
can be rewritten as c = (r−n)k+wl. Therefore, a necessary condition for an steady
state economy must satisfy that both c˙ = 0 and k˙ = 0, or equivalently:
r = δ + γn,
or











Up to this point we have proven that an economy with an interest rate that
satisfies either equation (4.18) or (4.19) is under a steady state. From equation (4.18)
we immediately know that an interest rate is the modified golden rule. However,
we have not yet specified an interest rate contained in the equation (4.19). In order



















Plugging the initial consumption into the equation (4.19), we find that































which is exactly the proportion of workers per capita under an stable population.
Therefore, r = n satisfies the equation (4.19).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Given that private markets offer actuarially fair annu-
ities and the population structure is stable over time, we only need to demonstrate
that the initial consumption under both systems is the same whenever r = n. Thus,
calling equation (4.25)
c(0) =
















































































This result is the same as the initial consumption of a funded social security.
145
4.8 Simulations
We have studied in Chapters 2 and 3 the allocation process of an individual, and its
consequences to certain economic variables such as wealth, consumption, and the
demand for private annuities. Now, we are interested in studying, through various
simulations, how an economy populated by perfect foresighted agents converges to
the golden rule equilibrium.
In this chapter we have showed that an economy either with a funded or with an
unfunded social security system achieves the golden rule equilibrium. Furthermore,
the economy as a whole will prefer to stay at this steady state, since the consumption
per capita is maximized. Therefore, we will focus in this subsection on the golden
rule equilibrium and its properties.
We have divided this subsection according to Table 4.2 below. The first figure
shows the economic transitions from the initial state to the golden rule, when the
population has the survival probability of the cohort born in 1940 and the mandatory
age of retirement is 65 years old. The next figure shows the economic transitions of
the previous population, but now the mandatory age of retirement is 70 years old.
The rest of the figures continue with different survival probabilities.
The majority of figures have six paths. They represent the economic transitions
of a funded and an unfunded social security according to different payroll taxes, as
well as different risk aversion coefficients. In particular, we simulate two payroll
taxes {.075, .15} of an unfunded social security. Additionally, a payroll tax equal
to zero represents a funded social security system, since this system does not affect
the allocation process of an individual. In addition to the social security, we have
also assumed two risk aversion coefficients {.75, 2} because of the influence of this
parameter on consumption.
The first results obtained through these simulations can be seen in Table 4.2.
A delay in the age of retirement clearly has a positive effect on economic growth.
Nonetheless, this result needs further research, within this current framework, re-
garding the simulations introduced in Chapter 3. Furthermore, we find that, given
146
the age of retirement, the greater the life expectancy is, the lower both consumption
and physical capital per capita are. This is so because the relationship between
workers and retirees decreases. Thus, although savings during the working period
increase due to the greater life expectancy after retirement, it does not balance the
losses yielded by the greater number of retirees. However, we have shown in Chapter
3 that the existence of both public and private pension systems can contribute to
raising individual wealth. This fact is worth considering for future research as well.
Second, we find looking at figures from 4.6 to 4.13 that economic variables do
not move in a straight line. In contrast, figures show that economic transitions are
cyclical. The importance of this feature is twofold. First, because it rejects the use of
linear models for estimating the economic growth of any economy.15 For example,
if we have data of the first hundred years after the initial state, the econometric
model will estimate that a funded social security is better than an unfunded social
security. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not support the proposition 4.2. Thus,
rather than the linear model, our results suggest to use a time series model with
sines and cosines. On the other side, the greater the number of cycles, the more
stable the economy becomes. Note that to come to this conclusion we have not
included from figure 4.7 to figure 4.13 the case in which γ = .75 and τ = 0. We
have done so because in that case the golden rule is an unstable focus. However, the
rest of the economic transitions seem to be stable. Concretely, we have found that
the economy is more stable under the following conditions: i) the greater the risk
aversion is, ii) the higher the age of retirement is, and iii) the greater the payroll
tax levied by an unfunded social security is. On the contrary, an economy is more
unstable: i) the greater the life expectancy becomes, and ii) when the economy has
a funded social security, instead of an unfunded one.















Table 4.2: Steady Consumptions and Physical
Capitals per Capita: Golden Rule
r∗ = .0150 J = 65 J = 70
Cohorts k∗ c∗ k∗ c∗
1940 128.998 18.367 131.536 18.728
1960 125.816 17.914 129.257 18.404
1980 123.855 17.635 127.686 18.180
2000 121.677 17.325 125.864 17.921
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Figure 4.6: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1940, J = 65.
























(a) Consumption per capita





















(b) Physical Capital per capita
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Figure 4.7: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1940, J = 70.
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Figure 4.8: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1960, J = 65.
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Figure 4.9: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1960, J = 70.
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Figure 4.10: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1980, J = 65.
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Figure 4.11: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 1980, J = 70.
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Figure 4.12: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 2000, J = 65.
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Figure 4.13: Economic Transitions from (k(0),c(0)) to the Golden Rule
Equilibrium. Case: Cohort 2000, J = 70.
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Chapter 5
Conclusiones y Futuras L´ıneas
de Investigacio´n
El objetivo que hemos perseguido en la presente tesis ha sido ilustrar y explicar la
conveniencia de un sistema pu´blico de pensiones. Los resultados obtenidos, tanto
teo´ricos como simulados, sugieren que la escasa demanda de seguros de vida y pen-
siones podr´ıa explicarse por medio del comportamiento miope de los individuos.
Este comportamiento justificar´ıa la necesidad de un sistema pu´blico de pensiones.
Por otra parte, cuando el agente econo´mico es miope y egoista y las instituciones
financieras no permiten que las personas mueran endeudadas, una seguridad social
de capitalizacio´n podr´ıa contribuir a aumentar la riqueza de los agentes econo´micos
antes de su jubilacio´n. As´ı, la carga fiscal derivada del envejecimiento poblacional
podr´ıa ser mitigada mediante la aplicacio´n de este sistema. Por u´ltimo, tambie´n de-
mostramos, siempre que la economı´a crezca segu´n la regla de oro, que una seguridad
social de reparto es preferible frente a una seguridad social de capitalizacio´n.
En el Cap´ıtulo 2 hemos demostrado que las rentas actuariales de cara´cter privado
no siempre suponen, para el agente econo´mico, una ganancia de bienestar frente
a las rentas financieras. En particular, la decisio´n de contratar bien una renta
actuarial, o bien una renta financiera, depende de la relacio´n entre el valor presente
de los ingresos futuros y el nivel inicial de riqueza. Este resultado se explica bajo la
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hipo´tesis de que el agente econo´mico es egoista y no le preocupa el hecho de tener una
posicio´n deudora no cubierta por un seguro. Por lo tanto, los agentes econo´micos
pueden decidir el no contratar una renta actuarial y, como consecuencia, malgastar
sus recursos financieros antes de fallecer. Ahora bien, a pesar de que la Seguridad
Social puede ayudar al agente a no malgastar sus recursos, una contribucio´n a la
Seguridad Social que no sea o´ptima podr´ıa producir, en el corto plazo, un efecto
expulsio´n sobre el stock de capital. Al respecto, en esta tesis demostramos, a medida
que la contribucio´n a la Seguridad Social es mayor, que los individuos egoistas esta´n
ma´s predispuestos a invertir su riqueza en bonos que en seguros. Sin embargo,
tambie´n demostramos que, aunque la Seguridad Social desincentiva la compra de
rentas actuariales y pensiones privadas, el sistema pu´blico puede ayudar a aumentar
la riqueza. Por consiguiente, podemos afirmar que existe un tipo de contribucio´n
a la Seguridad Social que maximiza la suma del capital invertido en el sistema
pu´blico y privado de pensiones. En particular, hemos obtenido que un tipo de
contribucio´n “o´ptimo”, en torno al 6 por ciento, tiene como efecto negativo que el
agente econo´mico no invierta en seguros al comienzo de su ciclo vital, pero como
efecto positivo que su riqueza a la edad de jubilacio´n sea un 17 por ciento mayor.
El modelo econo´mico de equilibrio parcial, utilizado para explicar los anteriores
resultados, no permite sin embargo estudiar las consecuencias derivadas en el largo
plazo del posible efecto expulsio´n del capital. Tal es as´ı que este modelo no tiene en
cuenta los cambios que producen la estructura poblacional y el consumo agregado
en el precio futuro de los factores productivos. Por lo cual, con el objetivo de
analizar los efectos econo´micos producidos por la Seguridad Social en el largo plazo,
en el Cap´ıtulo 4 se desarrolla un modelo de crecimiento econo´mico con generaciones
solapadas, cuyo marco contable es longitudinal en vez de transversal. Gracias a
este nuevo marco contable, hemos demostrado que, en una economı´a compuesta por
individuos egoistas y racionales y por compan˜´ıas aseguradoras que ofrecen seguros
actuarialmente justos, los sistemas de capitalizacio´n y de reparto alcanzan los estados
estacionarios correspondientes a la regla de oro y a la regla de oro modificada. Por
tanto, la seguridad social de reparto no genera un efecto expulsio´n sobre el stock de
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capital f´ısico. Adema´s, cuando la economı´a crece al mismo ritmo que la poblacio´n
(regla de oro), ambos sistemas de financiacio´n de la seguridad social proporcionan el
mismo bienestar. Sin embargo, el sistema de reparto confiere una mayor estabilidad
a la economı´a. Por todo ello, parece razonable afirmar que cuando la economı´a
satisface la regla de oro, una seguridad social de reparto es preferible frente a una
seguridad social de capitalizacio´n.1
En resumen, el cuerpo de esta tesis compuesto por los cap´ıtulos del 2 al 4, desde
el modelo de equilibrio parcial al modelo de crecimiento econo´mico con generaciones
solapadas, extiende el marco teo´rico para analizar los efectos de la Seguridad So-
cial en el crecimiento econo´mico. De hecho, cada cap´ıtulo aporta nuevos resultados,
tanto teo´ricos como emp´ıricos, con respecto a los sistemas de reparto y capitalizacio´n
de la seguridad social. No obstante, estos resultados no agotan las l´ıneas de investi-
gacio´n futuras, pues existen mu´ltiples formas de aplicacio´n de la presente tesis con
datos econo´micos reales.
Una primera l´ınea de investigacio´n es incorporar el comportamiento miope, de-
scrito en los cap´ıtulos 2 y 3, en el modelo de crecimiento econo´mico con genera-
ciones solapadas. La necesidad de encontrar me´todos alternativos de financiacio´n
a la Seguridad Social justifica esta l´ınea de investigacio´n. As´ı, en esta tesis hemos
demostrado que, cuando los agentes econo´micos aseguran sus ahorros, una seguri-
dad social de reparto es ma´s conveniente que una seguridad social de capitalizacio´n.
Sin embargo, ese escenario no se da en la realidad. Por lo tanto, el incorporar la
posibilidad de que los individuos no aseguren su riqueza, parece ser lo ma´s acertado.
De este modo, la bu´squeda de un tipo de contribucio´n a la Seguridad Social que
maximize el stock de capital nacional podra´ ser encontrado, no so´lo para el corto
plazo, sino tambie´n para el largo plazo.
Una segunda l´ınea de investigacio´n es analizar el modelo de crecimiento econo´mico
con generaciones solapadas, incorporando tanto las transiciones demogra´ficas como
las expectativas racionales. En este caso, las herramientas econome´tricas (por ejem-
1El resto de estados estacionarios no han sido simulados en esta tesis pues o bien son inestables,
o bien no son Pareto-eficientes.
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plo, series temporales y cadenas de markov) constituira´n el marco anal´ıtico fun-
damental. En definitiva, esta l´ınea de investigacio´n sera´ aplicada al estudio de la
viabilidad de cualquier sistema de Seguridad Social.
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